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NOTES
[The Parliament of Great Britain, in response to popular expression, has under-
taken what vniqht well be termed a peaceful revolution: the nationalization of large
areas of British industry. To date, the Bank of England and the gas, electricity,
transport, cable and wireless, aviation, and coal industries have been nationalized; at
present writing the nationalization of the steel industry, though not yet effected, seems
imminent.
[These facts are well known to the American public; the techniques by which the
process has taken place have been emphasized to a much lesser degree. In the Notes
which follow, the REVIEW has sought to explore the various statutes which have
effected the transfer. Manifestly, any undertaking so comprehensive and detailed, with
attendant social and political consequences and implications cannot adequately be
treated within a comparatively few pages. The Notes therefore have concentrated on
only three aspects of the statutes: compensation for the former owners; administra-
tion; and labor relations. The merits of the British program are neither assumed
nor denied. Nationalization is a fait accompli. Only techniques, problems which are
created by these techniques, and possible consequences of the statutes are treated.-ED.]
British Nationalization of Industry-Compensation to
Owners of Expropriated Property
Comprehensive expropriation of entire groups of enterprises, accom-
plished by the British nationalization statutes,' constitutes a new step in
the English law of compulsory purchase 2 and poses novel problems of
payment to owners. The detailed procedures established for the assess-
ment and satisfaction of compensation seem of interest (1) in their rela-
tionship to existing rules of compensation for compulsory purchase, and
(2) as reflecting the particular problems involved in paying for such large-
scale transfers of assets.
Of the questions embraced by the rules of compulsory purchase, the
measurement of the amount owed 3 and the method of settlement 4 will be
dealt with herein. As regards each of these, difficulties posed by the
unprecedented size of the acquisitions, 5 current economic uncertainty,6
and the complex organization and poor condition of certain of the indus-
tries,7 made the application of accepted principles of compensation largely
1. Gas Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Gno. VI, c. 67; Electricity Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEO. VI,
c. 54; Transport Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEo. VI, c. 49; Cable and Wireless Act, 1946, 9
& 10 GEO. VI, c. 82; Civil Aviation Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. VI, c. 70; Coal Industry
Nationalisation [Collieries] Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEO. VI, c. 59; Bank of England Act,
1946, 9 & 10 GEo. VI, c. 27. These acts are cited hereinafter by short-title and section
number only.
2. Compulsory purchase is the British term for what is referred to in American
law as eminent domain. The former expression will be used to indicate both.
3. E. g., Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 (1878); Acquisition of Land
(Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, 9 & 10 GEO. V, c. 57, § 2; Comment, 26
Tnx. L. REv. 199 (1947).
4. E. g., O'Neill v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board, [1938] N. Ir. R. 104
(C. A. 1937) ; Comment, 3 LEGAL NoTEs ON LOCAL GOV'T 199 (1938).
5. Perhaps the largest compulsory purchase made prior to the Collieries Act was
the acquisition in 1938 of all unworked coal in Great Britain, having a total value
of £66,450,000. Coal Act, 1938, 1 & 2 GEo. VI, c. 52, § 6. Compensation for the coal
industry amounted to more than £164,000,000, for the rail industry, to more than
£1,065,000,000. 431 H. C. DEB. 1617-1618 (5th ser. 1946); London Times, Aug. 2,
1946, p. 4, col. 5.
6. See, e. g., the speech of the Prime Minister introducing the nationalization
program at an opening session of Parliament. 413 H. C. DEB. 105 (5th ser. 1945).
7. See, e. g., CAID. No. 6610 at 30 (1945); 432 H. C. DEB. 1406-1410 (5th ser.
1947).
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impractical. Although English law contains no constitutional prohibition
against confiscation,8 the legislative history of the relevant statutes indi-
cates that their compensation provisions were intended as a proper bal-
ance between public necessity and the rights of individual owners., Hence,
consideration of why particular measures were applied to particular indus-
tries and of respects in which they seem an adequate or inadequate basis
for fair exchange, should assist in an understanding of the problems of
compensation at a national level.
Measurement of compensation in compulsory purchase may be divided
into three steps: (1) the selection of a standard of evaluation; 10 (2) the
application of the standard, i. e., the segregation of the assets to be valued,
and the choice of the factors which properly indicate value under the
standard; 11 and (3) the admission or exclusion of additional payments
for consequential damages.'
2
STANDARDS AND THEIR APPLIcATION
A constitutional standard governs the calculation of compensation in
the United States; in England an owner is entitled only to what is ac-
corded him by statute.13 Yet the law of both countries, in a substantial
majority of instances, requires as a standard of value the price that the
property would bring in a voluntary sale on the open market.' 4 In the
application of this standard, the evaluation of condemned public utilities-
the closest parallel to nationalization-is especially problematic since market
value in such cases involves an estimate of "going-concern" value.15 In
dealing with such transfers, English courts have used the capitalization of
"maintainable revenue," as a formula for application. This arrives at
market value by first determining the average annual net earnings which
the enterprise has previously realized, and can reasonably be expected to
maintain, and then calculating the capital figure which would produce such
8. British law confers no right of compensation unless provided for by the statute
authorizing the expropriation. Regina v. St. Luke's, Chelsea, L. R. 7 Q. B. 148
(1871). The due process clauses of the United States Constitution require that "just"
compensation be given for condemnation under eminent domain. U. S. CONST.
AMENDS. V, XIV, § 1, Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13 (1933).
9. E. g, 431 H. C. DFB. 1627 (5th ser. 1946).
10. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN 48 (1936).
11. E. g., United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369 (1943) ; Acquisition of Land
(Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, 9 & 10 GEo. V, c. 57, § 2 (3) ; Hale, Value
to the Taker in Condemnation Cases, 31 COL. L. REv. 1 (1931).
12. Compare Chicago, M. & St P. Ry. v. Hock, 118 Ill. 589, 9 N. E. 205 (1886),
with White v. Cincinnati R. & M. R. R., 34 Ind. App. 287, 71 N. E. 276 (1st Div.
1904). Compare Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N. Y. 533, 148 N. E. 668 (1925),
with Cooper v. Metropolitan Board of Works, 25 Ch. D. 472 (C. A. 1883).
13. See note 8 supra. A recent Australian case, Bank of New South Wales v.
Commonwealth, 22 AuST. L. J. 191 (High Ct. Aug. 11, 1948), emphasizes the con-
stitutional implications of nationalization. Compensation provisions of a 1947 Austra-
lian statute nationalizing banks were held violative of an express constitutional re-
quirement that acquisition be on "just terms." Commonwealth of Australia Consti-
tution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 VIcr., c. 12, § 51 (xxxi). The statute called for "fair
and reasonable" compensation, but certain of the sections were considered inconsistent
with this objective.
14. City of New York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57 (1915); Lebanon and Nashville
Turnpike Co. v. Creveling, 159 Tenn. 147, 17 S. W. 2d 22 (1929); In re London
County Council and London Street Tramways Co., [1894] 2 Q. B. 189 (C. A.) ; Acqui-
sition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, 9 & 10 GEo. V, c. 57,
§ 2(2) ; ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 56.
15. E. g., Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U. S. 180 (1910).
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earnings at the rate of return on investments ascribable to this business.16
American courts, rejecting any attempt to capitalize earnings, either realized
or prospective, as too speculative,"7 determine plant value and going-concern
value separately.' The latter, a value attributable to an operation beyond
the worth of its physical holdings by virtue of its character as a func-
tioning and profitable unit, seems scarcely less speculative. Evidence of
past and prospective earnings seems necessarily admissible; 19 and these
cannot be correctly related to the amount sought without some estimated
capitalization, adjusted to account for business conditions. 20  Ultimately,
going-concern value turns upon a reasonable judgment, considerate of all
factors which affect the price that any purchaser would pay.21  It should
be noted, further, that the final compensation does not follow on mere
addition of plant and going-concern values, but emerges as a "composite
estimate" of the worth of the whole, based upon contemplation of the con-
tributing elements.
2 2
That the exigencies of the nationalization program should dictate de-
viation from established standards is not surprising. The resultant varia-
tions in the compensation schemes are significant, and can be most effectively
analyzed comparatively.
Market Value.-In certain areas, the nationalization program has re-
tained the usual standard of market value. The Collieries Act affected a
large industry of complex structure, involving numerous independent en-
terprises of sharply varied size and solvency, many of which conducted
additional operations considerably removed from coal production.2 3  Com-
pensation was to be the amount that a willing buyer would pay a willing
seller for the transferred assets.2 4  It could be expected that this standard
would require long and complicated arbitration; 25 yet its selection was
not deference to precedent, since the earlier Bank Act had provided an
example of abandonment of the standard of market value. However, since
the standard of the Bank Act gave as compensation an income equal to
the total income paid by outstanding securities, 26 its adoption was not
16. Re Belfast Corp. and Cavehill and Whitewell Tramway Co., 45 Ir. L. T. 231
(K. B. 1911). For a discussion of problems involved in the net maintainable revenue
formula, see 151 THE EcoxomIST 223 (1946).
17. National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 62 Fed. 853 (8th Cir. 1894); Ken-
nebec Water District v. Waterville, 97 Me. 185, 54 Atl. 6 (1902).
18. Baxter Springs v. Bilger's Estate, 110 Kan. 409, 204 Pac. 678 (1922) ; Mifflin
Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365, 22 Atl. 896 (1891).
19. Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 168 Mass. 541, 47 N. E. 533 (1897).
20. Re Los Angeles, P. U. R. [1929C] 389, 399 (Cal. Railroad Comm'n).
21. Re Chippewa Falls, P. U. R. [1927A] 545, 558 (Wis. Railroad Comm'n 1926).
22. E. g., San Francisco v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., P. U. R. [1929E] 529, 537
(Cal. Railroad Comm'n) ; cases cited note 18 spra.
23. See, for comments on the complexity and size of the coal industry, 418 H. C.
DEB. 702-703 (5th ser. 1946); Gilbert, The Nationalization of Coal, 11 CoNVEY. &
PRop. 99-100 (1946) ; London Times, Dec. 19, 1945, p. 9, col. 1. Examples of non-
colliery operations can be found in Collieries Act, 1st Schedule, §§ 14 (farms and
farming equipment), 15 (manufactured-fuel plants), 19 (brickworks).
24. Collieries Act §§ 10(3), 13(4). The mine owners and the government
agreed, prior to the passage of the Act, on the standard to be adopted in measuring
value. Their agreement is embodied in CmD. No. 6716 (1945), which is incorporated
into the Collieries Act by § 10(3).
25. Extended arbitration and delayed compensation had already been experienced.
Compensation for the nationalization of unworked coal (see note 5 supra) was not
settled for eight years. London Times, July 17, 1946, p. 4, col. 3.
26. Bank Act § 1(2). For the terms under which the Bank of England was ac-
quired, see note 58 infra and text.
feasible. The coal industry was not, as was the Bank, a sound undertaking
of assured future returns.27  Further, a large proportion of the industry's
assets were not purchased; 28 hence, such a measure of compensation would
have resulted in overpayment, or would have involved intricate calcula-
tions to apportion the total industrial income between transferred and un-
transferred assets. For the same reason, compensation based on the mar-
ket value of securities, as was offered in subsequent statutes, 29 was in-
advisable.
The Cable and Wireless Act applied to the nationalization of a single
concern a standard identical to that in the Collieries Act.30  The company
was secure and of good prospects, holding a long franchise at a guaranteed
income of four per cent.31 Since the maintainable revenue formula was
used, the market value of such an organization was relatively easy to
ascertain. On the other hand, its security did not warrant compensation
so favorable as that given the Bank of England; since payments for all
nationalization purchases were made in low-yield government securities,
3 2
an income basis would have required a capital outlay greatly exceeding
the face value of the securities thus replaced.
83
The Electricity Act provided that market value be paid for non-
statutory undertakings, i. e., electric companies whose existences were not
based on statutory licenses.34 Although not expressly stated, a similar
standard appears to have been required by the Transport Act for truck-
ing companies.3 5 In each instance, the compensation was more favorable
than that accorded elsewhere in the same statute.3 6 With regard to electric
companies, it seems likely that the government was willing to pay more
for a non-statutory than a statutory undertaking, since the latter's right to
do business depends on government permission.3 7 Trucking companies
may have been accorded more favorable terms than railroads and other
27. On the financial condition of the Bank, see 415 H. C. DEE. 47-48 (5th ser.
1945). For that of the coal industry, see CMD. No. 6610 at 29-38 (1945).
28. Those assets not sufficiently related to colliery activity were not expropriated.
Collieries Act §§ 5-7; see note 23 supra.
29. Gas Act §§ 25, 30; Electricity Act §§ 20, 25; Transport Act §§ 16, 17(1). For
a discussion of compensation under these acts, see note 67 infra and text.
30. Cable and Wireless Act § 2(2). See 423 H. C. DEB. 205-206 (5th ser. 1946)
for a discussion of the complex holding company ownership of Cable and Wireless.
31. 423 H. C. DEB. 215 (5th ser. 1946) ; 149 THE EcoNoMIsT 686 (1945).
32. See note 103 infra and text. The compensation securities, referred to as "gov-
ernment stock" by the nationalization statutes, are equivalent to certain types of gov-
ernment bonds in the United States. Where possible, this Note has sought to avoid
confusion by use of the word "securities."
33. To replace the 127,400,000 of outstanding Cable and Wireless stock with
three per cent government bonds (approximately the rate of interest carried by the
compensation securities) so as to give an equal income, would have required a capital
expenditure of ;36,920,000. Bank stock worth 614,553,000 cost the government
158,212,000 in three per cent securities. The Bank however was an unimpeachable
investment, whereas Cable and Wireless was subject to considerable foreign competi-
tion. 423 H. C. Dan. 209-211 (5th ser. 1946) ; Minutes of Proceedings of the Select
Committee on the Bank of England Bill 1 (1945) ; 2 CLAPHAM, HISTORY OF THE BANK
OF ENGLAND 425 (1944) ; 149 THE ECONOMIST 686 (1945).
34. Electricity Act § 48(6).
35. Transport Act §§47(1), 47(2), 47(3).
36. Other activities given less favorable compensation were: Electricity Act § 20
(statutory companies) ; Transport Act § 16 (rail and canal).
37. E. g., the termination of the licenses of certain statutory electric companies is
authorized by Electric Lighting Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vicr., c. 56, §§ 2, 3. Note that in
the United States even a terminable franchise is compensable property. Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312 (1893).
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transport facilities because, as successful competitors of the latter, they
were generally in better financial condition and enjoyed more promising
futures.3 8
As has been indicated, the application of the market value standard
presents particular difficulty when productive business is involved. Cer-
tain of the methods adopted under nationalization significantly reflect the
added problems of application to an entire industry.
The procedure established by the Collieries Act for the segregation
and valuation of transferable colliery assets indicates complexities which
prompted abandonment of this standard in subsequent statutes. The
varied character of the assets necessitated two separate valuations: a
"value for subsidiary purposes"; and a "coal industry value." The former
contemplated assets not closely related to coal mining and was assessed
for each company by district valuation boards; 3 9 the latter contemplated
assets which had been considered in making district wage ascertainments
under an earlier minimum wage statute.40 These ascertainments pro-
vided a convenient record of colliery assets, on the basis of which a special
tribunal calculated "coal industry value" for the entire industry. The re-
sultant "global sum" 41 was apportioned to districts by a central valuation
board, and thereafter to companies by the district boards. 42  Thus, com-
pensation was made for the value of the industry, not for the total value
of all the individual undertakings. 43  Since the government assumed con-
trol of the entire industry, it may have seemed reasonable that it should
pay for it on that basis; it was unwilling to pay the bonus for superior
competitive position that would have been due were individual purchases
made. The result, however, seems unfair to the owners. Since market
value reflects earning power, the global sum was reduced by the inclusion
of unprofitable concerns in the calculation. Efficient companies received
their proper relative share in the compensation, but a lesser absolute amount
than they would have been paid under individual evaluation.44  Then,
since the global sum was to undergo two subsequent apportionments by
different tribunals before final settlement, there was a decided possibility
that final distribution would be made on different terms than the initial
calculation. If so, certain individual owners would suffer a relative, as
well as an absolute loss. 45 In addition, it would seem that rather than
expediting ultimate payment as its proponents argued, this method may,
by adding two steps, actually delay it.
40
38. 436 H. C. DEB. 1636-1646 (5th ser. 1947) ; 431 H. C. DEB. 1658-1659, 1819,
2028 (5th ser. 1946).
39. Collieries Act §§ 10(2) (b), 10(5) (b), 13(1).
40. Collieries Act § 10(2). District wage ascertainments were made pursuant to
Coal Mines Minimum Wage Act, 1912, 2 & 3 GEO. V, c. 2. See 418 H. C. DE-B. 710
(5th ser. 1946).
41. This term was applied to the amount which was to be calculated as the "coal
industry value" of the entire industry. See 418 H. C. DEB. 806 (5th ser. 1946).
42. Collieries Act §§ 10-13.
43. Global compensation had been used earlier in the nationalization of unworked
coal. In that case, however, no going-concern value was involved. Coal Act, 1938,
1 & 2 GEo. VI, c. 52, § 6. See 418 H. C. DEB. 791-792 (5th ser. 1946).
44. See 418 H. C. DEB. 793-794 (5th ser. 1946); 150 THE ECONOMIST 312 (1946).
45. See 418 H. C. DEB. 791-792 (5th ser. 1946); London Times, Jan. 30, 1946, p.
4, col. 1.
46. The global sum was calculated in less than two months. London Times, June
17, 1946, p. 4, col. 6, Aug. 2, 1946, p. 4, col. 5. The remaining stages may not be com-
pleted for some years. See 418 H. C. DEB. 794 (5th ser. 1946) ; note 25 supra.
With respect to the formula to be applied in evaluation of the trans-
ferred assets, the Collieries and Cable and Wireless acts provided that
market value be measured by the capitalization of net maintainable reve-
nue.47 Such an approach seems more adaptable to assessing compensation
for entire industries than the American process of separately calculating
plant and going-concern values, since it somewhat narrows the area of
investigation and may be more expeditiously computed. In effect, it
obviates the monumental task of an industry-wide evaluation of physical
property.48 Yet it is scarcely a mathematical calculation: the tribunal
must estimate how much of the total revenue was earned by the trans-
ferred assets, 49 what can properly be taken as average revenue,50 what
the prospects of its future maintenance are, and what rate of capitalization
is applicable to the industry at that time.51 However, the argument of
American courts that predictions as to maintenance of earnings are overly
speculative has less weight when the evaluation has such scope; total in-
dustry income is more likely to remain constant than is that of a single
undertaking. Fluctuations in the latter are in many cases primarily due
to intra-industry competition, by which the former would not be materially
affected.
Market value for trucking companies was ascertained by separate
assessments of physical asset value and "cessation of business damages"-
the latter being a means of expressing going-concern value.52  It is in-
teresting to note the similarity of this formula to that employed in Amer-
ican cases; its adoption may have resulted from recognition that main-
tainable revenue does not fairly apply to the valuation of a new and grow-
ing business.53 However, going-concern value for trucking companies was
limited to a maximum of five times the net annual profit,54 probably an un-
dervaluation with respect to the more efficient and prosperous firms; in
this regard the provision reflects the fact that this was a national, not an
individual purchase, for which compensation was to be restricted according
to an arbitrary estimate of total industry value to the purchaser. 55
47. Cable and Wireless Act § 2(2); Collieries Act §§ 10(3) [referring to CMD.
No. 6716 (1945)], 13(4).
48. The proper basis for evaluating physical plant is a perplexing problem even
where no more than a single undertaking is involved. Compare National Water-
works Co. v. Kansas City, 62 Fed. 853 (8th Cir. 1894), with In. re London County
Council and London Street Tramways Co., [1894] 2 Q. B. 189 (C. A.). See ORGEL,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 638-667.
49. This problem arises only where part of an industry's assets are taken. See
Re Chatterly Whitfield Collieries, Ltd., [1948] 2 All Eng. 593, 597 (C. A.).
50. CAID. No. 6716, Annex II (1945) shows the pre-war earnings figures to be
used as a basis for compensation. These vary from a surplus of ;127,380,000 in 1923
to deficit of 19,990,000 in 1928.
51. The speculative nature of an estimate as to future earnings and proper capi-
talization rate has been the principal ground for the rejection of this method of calcu-
lation in American courts. See ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 713-714.
52. See London Times, Nov. 30, 1946, p. 9, col. 1.
53. See note 38 supra. Since maintainable revenue is based on past earnings, its
use would not provide a true valuation of a young and healthy industry. See 151 THE
ECONOMIST 223 (1946).
54. Transport Act § 47(3).
55. The limitation was urgently challenged. See 431 H. C. DEB. 1789-1790, 1822
(5th ser. 1946). Another method of applying the market value standard appears in
provisions for agreement between the parties to the compulsory transfer. See British
Overseas Airways Act, 1939, 2 & 3 GEO. VI, c. 61, 3d Schedule. It is interesting to
note that the Australian statute which nationalized banks in 1947 provided for such
agreements. However, it also empowered the government to appoint new managers
for the banks to be acquired and the new managers were authorized to conduct the
negotiations. This was held unconstitutional. Bank of New South Wales v. Com-
monwealth, 22 AusT. L. J. 191, 195, 201, 202, 204 (High Ct. Aug. 11, 1948).
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Replacement Cost.-The Transport Act, in providing for the pur-
chase of railroad cars owned by non-transport industries, established a
uniform schedule of prices representing the present cost of a similar car
minus a certain depreciation. 6 Although this may have proven harsh to
companies whose transport facilities had a going-concern value as part of
their systems, the government, acquiring only the separate vehicles, was
justified in paying no more than their individual worth. This is con-
sistent with a generally accepted principle that the proper standard of
evaluation in compulsory purchase is not value to the owner, but the value
that the expropriated items would bring on the open market.57 In this
respect, replacement cost is not a departure from market value. However,
it is to be noted that the application of the standard here was accomplished
without arbitration as to the proper criteria of value.
Outstanding Securities.-Among the statutes which abandoned market
value as a standard the Bank Act is singular, giving Bank shareholders,
as compensation, enough government bonds to bring an annual income
equivalent to that received in dividends from Bank holdings."8 This
measure was peculiarly applicable to the purchase of such an organization,
since the acquisition was less of physical assets with a going-concern value
than of capital rights in an institution controlling the financial structure
of an entire nation. Market value would seem an inappropriate concept.59
Since it was an eminently sound structure, such favorable terms were not
an unreasonable burden for the government to assume.0° There was but
one class of security holders, so that no preferred holdings were prejudiced
by giving all an equally assured income."' This standard, it is true, de-
nied the owners such share in accumulated reserves as would normally
be received in the event of the liquidation or sale of a business. 2 However,
since the purchaser was also the largest customer, it may have been felt
that no premium, beyond that which was accorded by the dividend basis
of compensation, should be paid for profits that resulted from government
business. 63 Also, the Bank's nature as a public service corporation with-
out the power to terminate its activities, meant that security holders had
no expectation of sharing in reserves through liquidation, 4 and, it was
maintained, the fact that the return on Bank holdings had been constant
for twenty-three years should have dispelled any belief that the reserves
would be distributed in increased dividends.6 5 It would seem that the
above arguments are applicable primarily to a concern of governmental
functions. 66 While it may be concluded from this that a private business
56. Transport Act § 30.
57. See ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 50.
58. Bank Act § 1(2).
59. See Minutes of Proceedings of the Select Committee on the Bank of England
Bill 7 (1945).
60. Capital stock of the Bank of England stood at i14,553,000 from 1816 until it
was nationalized. It had unfailingly returned a twelve per cent annual dividend for
twenty-three years. Id. at 1-3.
61. See 149 THE EcoNOMIsT 567 (1945).
62. See Minutes of Proceedings of the Select Committee on the Bank of England
Bill 7 (1945).
63. Id. at 12; 2 CLAPHAM, op. cit. supra note 33, at 425.
64. See Minutes of Proceedings of the Select Committee on the Bank of England
Bill 7, 8 (1945).
65. See id. at 10, 14, 18; 415 H. C. DEB. 48-49 (5th ser. 1945).
66. See 150 THE EcoNoMIsT 227 (1946).
should be compensated so as to include an allowance for reserves, it
should be remembered that such beneficent terms of compensation as were
applied here could scarcely be given except to a concern with the security
of a governmental undertaking.
With the exception of purchases of trucking companies and non-
statutory electric companies, the Transport Act, Electricity Act, and, most
recently, the Gas Act 67 provided that each shareholder in rail, electric,
and gas undertakings be paid an amount in government bonds equivalent
to the stock market value of his holdings, according to average daily
quotations computed for certain periods prior to the passage of the acts.
Railroads, as a result of their undeveloped and depreciated condition
and the increased competition from road transport, were considered to,
have a low market value.68 The government argued, therefore, that this
less favorable standard could justifiably be used, since determination of
market value would require extended, costly arbitration and yet might well
arrive at lower compensation. 69 Compensation on an income basis was
entirely unreasonable since, in many instances, it would replace a con-
tingent, risky security with a guaranteed equivalent income70 and would
involve a capital expenditure out of all proportion to the worth of the assets
acquired.71 Although simple and expeditious, the standard chosen failed
in several respects to meet the requirements of "fair compensation." 72 In
the specific case, the condition of the railroads was due in large measure
to wartime service under a government rental agreement that absorbed
much of their earnings.73 More broadly, fluctuating stock prices are, in
any one period, unacceptable as indices of the actual worth of property,
especially because of their susceptibility to influences which have no effect
on the value of physical assets.74 Quotations on any day or even on a
series of days result from only a few transactions relative to the number
of outstanding securities; and the majority of such transactions are generally
conducted in the more speculative securities.75 Almost inevitably, stock
67. Gas Act §§ 25, 30; Electricity Act §§ 20, 25; Transport Act §§ 16, 17(1).
68. The government summarized the rail industry as a "poor bag of physical
assets." 431 H. C. DEB. 1809 (5th ser. 1946).
69. 431 H. C. DEB. 1653, 1819-1820 (5th ser. 1946).
70. See, e. g., 431 H. C. DEB. 1702 (5th ser. 1946); 151 THE ECONOMIST 837
(1946).
71. As indicated in note 33 supra, to acquire i14,553,000 of Bank stock required
£658,212,000 in three per cent government securities. An equivalent difference in capi-
tal value would have been entirely unjustified in the purchase of rail undertakings.
431 H. C. DEB. 1818-1819 (5th ser. 1946).
72. Proponents of the nationalization measures maintained that "fair compensation"
was their objective. See 447 H. C. DEB. 231-232 (5th ser. 1948) ; 432 H. C. DEB.
1417 (5th ser. 1947); 431 H. C. DaB. 1627, 1690, 1822 (5th ser. 1946); 149 THE
EcoNOMIST 274 (1945).
73. The rental agreements under which the railroads were operated in wartime
appear in: Railways Agreement (Powers) Act, 1940, 4 & 5 GEo. VI, c. 5; S. R. & 0.,
1941, No. 2074; S. R. & 0., 1939, No. 1197. See 431 H. C. DEB. 1620-1621, 1828 (5th
ser. 1946) ; 151 THE ECONOMIST 1008 (1946).
74. 431 H. C. DEB. 1646, 1794-1795 (5th ser. 1946) ; London Times, May 7, 1947,
p. 10, col. 1. Remarking on the inappropriateness of stock market quotations as an
indication of the asset value of a concern, it has been pointed out that "loaded dice
sometimes fall fairly." 151 THE ECONOMIST 837 (1946).
75. During the period Nov. 1 to Nov. 8, 1946, on which dates quotations were
taken as the basis for compensation under Transport Act § 17, an average of 780
transactions of unknown size were recorded daily as against £1900,000,000 in out-
standing rail securities held in 1,000,000 separate accounts. 151 THE ECONOMIST 836
(1946). Note that this standard of compensation was rejected during the debate
on the British Overseas Airways Act, 1939, 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 61, because it was not
representative of the actual value of the enterprise to be purchased. 349 H. C. DEB.
1839-1840 (5th ser. 1939).
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quotations would be depressed by imminent nationalization. 76 Finally,
stock quotations would be lower in the case of companies which had de-
voted recent profits to expansion rather than to dividends; thus, the owners
of such progressive concerns lose not only the added compensation that
would have resulted had such dividends been paid out, but also the value
of the improvements to which such expenditures were applied. Since the
result of this would be to deter expansion by other industries fearing na-
tionalization, it seems impolitic as well as unfair.
77
In application, this standard eliminates the difficulties of segregation
and evaluation presented by the basis adopted previously under the Col-
lieries and Cable and Wireless acts. However, the acts based quotation
values on dates chosen by the purchaser, giving owners no right to present
arguments as to quotations more representative of the true worth of their
holdings. This appears to be a disproportionate emphasis on speed and
simplicity. Even though objectively and fairly applied by the purchaser,
it has a stamp of confiscation inconsistent with the principles of com-
pulsory purchase.7
8
Although such a standard may have been justified by the condition
of the railroads, similar argument could not be made respecting the
electric and gas industries, both of which were efficient and prosperous. 79
Thus the only ground for adherence to the security value basis of
compensation seems to be reluctance further to undergo the complex
and protracted arbitration involved in an ascertainment of the market
value of an industry.80 The repudiation of market value in the later
statutes was not, therefore, a result of conditions peculiar to the industry
acquired, but of problems inherent in all industrial purchases. The con-
clusion may be drawn that market value has been abandoned as a standard
for nationalization.
Purchases From Local Authorities.-Under the Gas, Electricity, and
Transport acts 81 local governments were given as compensation for the
loss of their undertakings an amount equal to the unpaid debts attributable
to them. The theory was that the public was both owner and purchaser,
and hence need pay nothing for the value of the assets acquired. 2  This
presented certain difficulties. Assuming that the objectives of nationali-
zation are coordination, uniform prices, and the elimination of competition
within the industry,8 3 it would seem that the fact that one local undertaking
was purchased for a lesser sum than another would not be reflected in
lower rates in the area of the former.8 4 If so, then a community which
76. See 431 H. C. DEB. 1646, 1795 (5th ser. 1946).
77. See 432 H. C. DEB. 1433-1434 (5th ser. 1947) ; 431 H. C. DEB. 1796 (5th ser.
1946) ; 152 THE EcoNOMIST 109 (1947).
78. This was argued by the opposition. See 431 H. C. DEB. 1792-1793 (5th ser.
1946).
79. 447 H. C. DEB. 242 (5th ser. 1947) ; 432 H. C. DEB. 1429 (5th ser. 1947).
80. This conclusion finds support in the legislative background of the later acts.
E. g., 447 H. C. DEB. 231-232 (5th ser. 1948) (Gas Act) ; 432 H. C. DEB. 1415 (5th
ser. 1947) (Electricity Act).
81. Gas Act § 28 (2) ; Electricity Act §§ 22 (2), 22 (3) ; Transport Act §§ 25 (4),
25(5).
82. See 432 H. C. DEB. 1414 (5th ser. 1947); 431 H. C. DEB. 1823 (5th ser.
1946).
83. This seems a valid assumption. It is the basis of an opposition argument in
the Transport Bill debates. See 431 H. C. DEB. 1675-1677 (5th ser. 1946).
84. However, there is an implication, in the debates on the Electricity Bill, that
consumers whose local service was appropriated would receive the advantage, in lower
rates, of any savings resulting to the government from the debt basis of compensation.
See 432 H. C. DEB. 1415 (5th ser. 1947).
paid high rates to hasten amortization of its debt, lost the advantage that
would have accrued to its rate payers in the form of lower rates, and,
if the enterprise was competitive, the economic advantage to the munici-
pality.8 5
ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION FOR CONSEQUENTIAL LOSSES
Consequential losses to owners resulting from the compulsory pur-
chase of their property fall into two categories: (1) losses incidental to
the taking; and (2) severance losses, i. e., the reduction in value of re-
maining property.86 Examples of the former are costs of removing un-
purchased assets and loss of good will. American cases, absent a statu-
tory requirement, have generally refused to award such damages.
8 7
English courts, on the other hand, admit them unless forbidden by statute.88
Examples of the latter occur when part of a business or a tract of land
is taken, leaving the remainder with less value than it had as a portion
of the whole. American courts have allowed such damages, provided there
was adequate physical connection before severance. In the case of com-
mercial undertakings, mere functional relationship was not enough.8 9 The
English rule is similar, except that functional relationship has been held
adequate to warrant severance damages. 90 Additional allowances under
nationalization were in some respects more generous, and in others more
limited than under existing rules.
Severance Damages.-Under the Collieries Act the only severance
damages given for the appropriation of the mines of a company were
compensation for the increased overhead resulting from reduced volume
of business.9 ' It can be seen that a railroad or a steel company deprived
of a captive mine might suffer little increased overhead, but considerable
added expense and loss of value to its remaining property, which under
this section would remain uncompensated. 2 It is likely that this is less
than would be given under the English requirement of mere functional
relationship, but more than under the American rule of physical de-
pendence. The Transport Act gave similar compensation where a truck-
ing business was acquired from a concern which conducted other opera-
tions as well.93 In certain cases, the Transport Act appropriated only a
85. See London Times, Feb. 6, 1947, p. 5, col. 5; 152 THaE EcoNOMIST 109 (1947).
86. See McColtmIcx, DAMAGES 535-542 (1935).
87. Moving costs: Newark v. Cook, 99 N. J. Eq. 527, 133 AtI. 875 (Ch. 1926);
In re Smith Street Bridge, 234 App. Div. 583, 255 N. Y. Supp. 801 (4th Dep't 1932).
Good will: Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N. Y. 533, 148 N. E. 668 (1925).
88. Moving costs: Cooper v. Metropolitan Board of Works, 25 Ch. D. 472 (C. A.
1883). Good will: Senior v. Metropolitan Ry., 2 H. & C. 258, 159 Eng. Rep. 107
(Ex. 1863).
89. Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 Pac. 705 (1915);
Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 219 Wis. 104, 261 N. W.
711 (1935).
90. Holditch v. Canadian Northern Ontario Rail Co., [1916] 1 A. C. 536 (P. C.);
Cowper Essex v. Local Board for Acton, 14 App. Cas. 153 (1889).
91. Collieries Act § 17. Payments were limited to the increased overhead for five
years after the transfer date.
92. Examples may be found in London Times, April 1, 1946, p. 8, col. 6; 149
THE EcoNOMIST 945-946 (1945).
93. Transport Act §47(4). Payments were limited to five years of increased
overhead.
19491 NOTES
530 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97
proportion of the assets of a trucking company.9 4  Where this occurred,
severance damages were awarded in a specified amount per vehicle-capac-
ity takenY5 Where a utility undertaking operated other services in addi-
tion to the supply of electricity it was paid, under the Electricity Act, as
damages for the severance of its electricity business, a specified amount
per unit of business acquired.9 6 Here again, such severance would be
compensable under the British rule, although the limitations fixed on
the total amount may have resulted in underpayment to some.
Capital Outlay.-It has been suggested that failure to compensate
for improvements too new to have added to the earnings of an under-
taking, unwisely discourages long-term expansion by industries anticipating
nationalization. Neither maintainable revenue, based on past earnings,
nor stock market value, based on past dividends, properly accounts for
such improvements. This defect is supplied by the Collieries Act, and,
although only for local authorities, by the Electricity Act, both of which
restore to the owners capital devoted to recent expansion.9 't Any reas-
surance such -provisions may have given, however, was negatived by the
neglect of such considerations in the Gas and Transport acts, and in the
other sections of the Electricity Act.
Interim Income.-The Collieries Act authorized payment to each
undertaking of an amount equal to one-half its former annual income for
a period between the transfer of its assets and final compensation. 8 Such
payments were limited to two years, although it was generally recognized
that settlement would not be completed Within such a time. This limita-
tion was apparently designed to discourage protraction of arbitration pro-
ceedings.99  The other statutes omit such a provision. Where the com-
pensation involved merely an exchange of securities, payments were not
delayed sufficiently to warrant interim compensation. No reason appears
for the omission where statutes call for the calculation of market value-
presumably none of the transfers under this standard were expected to en-
tail the same lengthy arbitration as followed the Collieries Act.
MODES OF PAYMENT
.American case law has held that the only constitutional method of
paying for condemned property is by cash. 00 In England, prior to
nationalization, cash was more frequently used, although not constitu-
94. Under certain circumstances, an owner could require that acquisitions be lim-
ited to vehicles operated under specific licenses, relating to the distance of the carriage
and the size of the vehicle. Nationalization was primarily confined to long-distance,
heavy trucking. Transport Act §§39(1), 52, 53, 54(1), 54(2).
95. Transport Act § 55 (5).
96. Electricity Act § 25 (1) (c).
97. Electricity Act § 24 (capital outlay subsequent to Nov. 19, 1945, was re-
funded) ; Collieries Act § 18 (capital outlay subsequent to Aug. 1, 1945, was refunded).
98. Collieries Act §§ 19(2), 22.
99. See 418 H. C. DEB. 795, 812 (5th ser. 1946); 150 THE EcoNoMIsT 806
(1946). The Collieries Act § 22(2) (a) provided also that compensation payments
(other than interim income) bear interest for the period between transfer and satis-
faction. Such a provision is absent from the other statutes. The omission of an
allowance for interest payments from the Australian nationalization act was held a
denial of fair compensation by a divided court. Bank of New South Wales v. Com-
monwealth, 22 AusT. L. J. 191, 199, 200 (High Ct. Aug. 11, 1948).
100. Vanhorn v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304 (U. S. 1795).
tionally required.10 1 Cash payments were considered impractical for
nationalization both because of the difficulty of raising the requisite amounts
and because of the unsettling effect on the money market of its appearance
in such large quantities.10 2 Thus the major items in each of the statutes
were paid in low interest bonds.10 3 Although perhaps the only solution,
this method was prejudicial, in certain respects, to the capital and income
holdings of those paid.
In considering the effect of such compensation, it is well to note that
certain of the payees differed in different statutes. Collieries compensation
was paid to the companies, since, in many cases they remained in existence
to operate other interests.10 4 Cable and Wireless compensation was paid
to nine holding companies as sole shareholders of the Cable and Wire-
less operating company. 0 5 In other instances, however, where the entire
assets of the undertakings were transferred, compensation was effected by
a direct exchange with security holders.106
Effect on Capital.-With the exception of certain cash payments 107
and the Bank Act which required payments of securities based on in-
come,'08 all compensation was settled by exchanging for the amount owed
an equivalent capital value of government securities. Excepting the Gas
Act,1 9 the valuation of such securities was at the discretion of the
Treasury, guided only by the requirement that due regard be had to the
prices of other government securities on the date of issue.110 Such a
provision seems to grant the purchaser an objectionable and unnecessary
freedom to name his own terms."' The requirements of the Gas Act
were similar. However, the prices which guided the valuation of the com-
pensation securities were those of similar securities on the date of transfer
of the assets. Were there a time lag between transfer and issue, trans-
ferees may have found that anticipation of large sales of such securities,
101. O'Neill v. Northern Ireland Transport Board, [1938] N. Ir. R. 104 (C. A.
1937) (discussion of the general rule). Statutes have usually specified the pay-
ment medium. See, e. g., British Overseas Airways Act, 1939, 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 61,
3d Schedule, pt. I, § 5, pt. II, § 5 (owners given a choice between cash and govern-
ment securities) ; Coal Act, 1938, 1 & 2 GEo. VI, c. 52, § 6(3) (cash). See London
Times, Nov. 19, 1946, p. 9, col. 1, for an opinion that compulsory purchase, to be
above suspicion, should accord cash compensation.
102. See 418 H. C. DEB. 809 (5th ser. 1946) ; 150 Tia ECONOMIST 499 (1946).
It has been suggested that since the effect of large cash payments in nationalization
is that owners receive compensation in an inflated currency actually worth less than
the assets sold, a cash basis of compensation is unfair. See Bank of New South
Wales v. Commonwealth, 22 Ausr. L.- J. 191, 202 (High Ct. Aug. 11, 1948).
103. Gas Act § 25(1) ; Electricity Act §§ 20(1), 25(3) ; Transport Act §§ 16(3),
32(1), 48(3), 89(2) ; Cable and Wireless Act § 1 (2) ; Collieries Act § 21; Bank Act
§ 1(2).
104. Collieries Act § 21.
105. Cable and Wireless Act § 2(4). For a description of the Cable and Wire-
less holding company organization, see 150 THE ECONOMIST 1014 (1946); 149 THE
ECONOMiST 686 (1945).
106. Gas Act § 25 (1) ; Electricity Act § 20 (1) ; Transport Act § 16(3).
107. E. g., Electricity Act § 48(6) (non-statutory undertakings); Transport Act
§§25(4) (payments to local authorities), 32(1) (certain payments for privately
owned railroad cars) ; Collieries Act § 22(2) (a) (interim income payments).
108. See note 58 supra and text.
109. Gas Act § 25.
110. See note 103 supra.
111. The provision aroused much unfavorable comment. See, e. g., London Times,
Nov. 19, 1946, p. 9, col. 1, April 29, 1946, p. 9, col. 1, Jan. 28, 1946, p. 2, col. 1; 150
THE ECONOMIST 128 (1946).
19491 NOTES
532 UNIVERSITY OP PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97
caused by their low yield, had forced the market price below that at which
the valuations were made."
2
As suggested, numerous sales of compensation securities by holders
who wished to reinvest at more nearly their former income could be ex-
pected. Capital loss to those receiving government securities might thus
be severe, since not only might such securities decrease in value, but the
price of high-dividend shares would go up, both in consequence of the in-
creased demand for them and because the amount available for purchase
would be reduced by the number taken up through nationalization. Pos-
sible means to maintain capital value of compensation securities would
be self-defeating: negotiability could be restricted, which would preserve
capital value but prevent its more profitable use; maintenance by a cash
guarantee or short redemption date would be tantamount to the cash pay-
ments that were sought to be avoided. Efforts in this direction were made
only in the Collieries Act," 3 which forbade transfer of compensation secu-
rities unless the company was to be dissolved or money was needed for
government-approved expansion. Many objected to this "blocked-stock"
provision as an undue invasion of individual rights, which may explain the
absence of such provisions in subsequent statutes.114 The restriction,
however, accomplished certain desirable alternative objectives: there was
a limitation put upon sales of compensation securities; where securities
were sold, the vendors were either companies encouraged by the restric-
tions to expand their remaining business, or companies which, left with
no assets other than the government bonds, hastened to wind up their
affairs."
5
Effect on Income.-The government bonds given in payment were
only briefly described in the nationalization statutes. Those provided
for by the Cable and Wireless, Collieries, and Bank acts were to be is-
sued by the Treasury and charged against the general credit of the
government; 116 those provided for by the Gas, Electricity, and Trans-
port acts were to be issued by the body which assumed control of the
particular industry, and charged against it. The Treasury, however,
guaranteed these securities as well."
7
The bonds were a typical, gilt-edged, non-terminating investment in
the government, irredeemable until a considerable time after issue." 8 With
the exception of the Bank Act," 9 the statutes made no provision as to the
interest to be paid by these securities. The government, however, was
following a policy of depressing the interest rates on gilt-edged invest-
ments, and consistent with this, the compensation securities could be ex-
112. For consideration as to the effect on the investment market, see 153 THE
ECONOMIST 578 (1947); 153 id. at 25.
113. Collieries Act § 23.
114. See, e. g., 418 H. C. Dn. 728-729, 795-796 (5th ser. 1946) ; London Times,
Dec. 22, 1945, p. 7, col. 1.
115. These alternatives are discussed at 418 H. C. DEB. 809-812 (5th ser. 1946).
116. Cable and Wireless Act § 1(2) (a); Collieries Act § 21; Bank Act
§§ 1 (1) (b), 1(2). See Note, The Role of the Public Corporation in British National-
ised Industry, 97 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 534, 539 (1949).
117. Gas Act § 45(1) ; Electrtricity Act §§40(1) (b), 40(2), 42(1) ; Transport
Act §§89(1) (b), 89(3), 90(1).
118. 153 THE ECONOMIST 25 (1947).
119. Bank Act § 1(2) provided that the securities should bear three per cent in-
terest.
pected to bear from three to 22 per cent interest. 20 Thus, in many
cases the individual transferees of government securities underwent
drastic income reductions .12 1  While the purchaser could not be expected
to guarantee risky, high-dividend shares their equivalent income, yet it
would not seem that the added security justified the fifty per cent loss
that some holders suffered.122  Those investors who preferred risky, high
incomes were forced to accept security or undergo considerable capital
loss.
SUMMARY
Compulsory purchase precedents have the same ultimate goal as
that controlling nationalization compensation measures-to express, in
payment, an accurate equilibration between the rights of owners and the
needs of the public. Different ingredient difficulties in each situation
postulate the differing legal results that appear in the statutes under con-
sideration. Nationalization is industry-wide. Hence a government may
not justifiably assume a debt disproportionate to the capabilities of the
entire industry. Prior acquisitions have generally been singular, and
attention could therefore be paid to individual earning capacity. Nationali-
zation valuation is intractable and endless; yet the vast amounts involved
require prompt settlement to prevent severe dislocation of the national
economy. Individual assessments have been shorter and simpler, and-
since concerned with lesser amounts-not so urgent. Consideration of
these elements premises, on the one hand, the conclusion that for the
usual compulsory purchase, market value best expresses the desirable
balance. It is a result of compromise and represents the sum that, under
ordinary circumstances, the owner should receive and the purchaser pay.
In the extraordinary circumstances of nationalization, on the other hand,
lies the divergence from former principles. It is not necessarily market
value that best reaches the equation sought. If, for example, arbitration
appears highly complicated and the industry of doubtful finances, a proper
balance of the interests may require a shift to some less favorable standard,
such as the stock market value of outstanding securities. Thus also with
methods of payment; under certain circumstances cash payments may be
so burdensome to the purchaser, and so injurious to the economy, that a
credit medium is entirely justified.
The novel and varied measures adopted in making compensation for
nationalization may be said to represent legislative decisions as to what
extent the public interest justifies less (or more) advantageous terms of
payment than might have been accorded under former principles. How
successsful the statutes have been in equating the rights of the parties is
conjecture; criticism herein of the various provisions is intended less to
indicate failure than to emphasize the problems involved. It must be
remembered that in estimating the "fairness" of compensation there must
not be an identification of fairness with some absolute idea of what owners
120. 153 THE EcoNoMIsT 578 (1947) discusses the interest rates on "Transport
Stock," i. e., securities issued as compensation by the Transport Commission. For
a comment on the government's "cheap money" policy, see 153 id. at 25.
121. Transport owners suffered an over-all income reduction of 118,804,669, or
about forty per cent. Since this was distributed among both high and low paying
securities, it can be seen that for some this constituted a loss of well over one-half
of their former income. See 431 H. C. DEB. 1798 (5th ser. 1946).
122. This was the argument made by the opposition. See 431 H. C. DEB. 1798-
1799 (5th ser. 1946). The government insisted that the added security counterbalanced
the loss. See 431 H. C. DEB. 1810-1812, 1821-1822 (5th ser. 1946).
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are entitled to receive for their property under all conditions. Rather it
should be considered whether the legislature, in coming to its conclusion,
gave the proper importance to each of the relevant factors. Fair is per-
haps an unfelicitous sobriquet-it is capable of many interpretations.
Nationalization is a drastic step in a nation which has reached Britain's
stature under a system of private enterprise. It seems inevitable that some
should suffer in the transition. If fair is to be used in evaluating the
success of nationalization compensation, the basis of reference should be
a consideration of whether, in view of the particular problems besetting
nationalization of that particular industry, adequate account has been taken
of each of the conflicting factors.
F. R. D., Jr.
The Role of the Public Corporation in British
Nationalized Industry
To date the Bank of England and six commercial industries have been
nationalized.' The administrative instrument chosen for the control of
these industries is the public corporation. This Note will be devoted to an
analysis of that instrument as circumscribed by the statutes creating the
nationalized industries.
2
THE CORPORATION AS A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT
Contrary to common supposition, public corporations are not a recent
development. In England as far back as the seventeenth century numerous
statutory local bodies were set up to supply community services.3 In the
United States, the corporate form was early adapted to the public func-
tion in the case of the Bank of North America, created in 1781 by the Con-
tinental Congress.4  After the adoption of the Federal Constitution the
first Bank of the United States 5 and, following within twenty-five years,
the second Bank of the United States 6 were created, both through the
use of the corporate device. It was in a suit involving the latter bank,
McCulloch v. Maryland,7 that Chief Justice Marshall upheld Congress'
power to create corporations for the purpose of carrying out the legislative
power granted by the Constitution. In Europe and South America the
public corporation has been an important instrument of governmental ac-
tivity; 8 it has even been adopted by Soviet Russia as part of its state-
1. Gas Act, 1948, 11 & 12 GEo. VI, c. 67; Electricity Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEo. VI,
c. 54; Transport Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEo. VI, c. 49; Cable and Wireless Act, 1946, 9
& 10 GEo. VI, c. 82; Civil Aviation Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. VI, c. 70; Coal Industry
Nationalisation [Collieries] Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. VI, c. 59; Bank of England Act,
1946, 9 & 10 GEO. VI, c. 27. These acts are cited hereinafter by short-title and sec-
tion number only.
2. The broad nature of English constitutional law and the supreme authority of
Parliament preclude what in the United States would be a vast field of examination.
3. Among these were improvement commissions, courts on sewers, and turnpike
trusts. Carpenter, Recent Developments in Public Enterprise, 45 THE SECRETARY 182
(1948).
4. Act of December 31, 1781, 7 J. oF CoNG. 197.
5. 1 STAT. 191 (1791).
6. 3 STAT. 266 (1816).
7. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
8. See Palmer, Government-Controlled Business Corporations: The European
and South American Experience, 10 TU.LAxE L. REv. 88 (1935).
controlled economic system.9 Never before, however, has the public cor-
poration to the extent it now has in England, entered the economic life of
a nation committed to freedom of enterprise.
While corporations responsible to public authority have been adopted
by diverse social and legal systems, their structure and characteristics
have varied according to the climate in which they have been created.
Common to all, however, has been the objective sought in choosing the
public corporation as an administrative instrument of governmental func-
tion rather than vesting that function in a government department. That
objective is flexibility and independence of management-recognition that
the public corporation represents the most convenient means of achieving
principles of private business efficiency in the field of public enterprise.
More specifically in the British experience, the complex and technological
nature of the undertakings involved, the need for managerial boldness and,
most of all, the desire to escape from the political interference resulting
from direct responsibility of government departments determined the
choice of the finstrument.10 The end is public ownership with public
accountability but with the freedom and elasticity of a private corporation.
It may also be conjectured that the British public was more willing to
accept a break from private ownership when it was clothed in a form
familiar to them. Not to be overlooked either is the attractiveness to the
private businessman of the corporate form, an effective foil to the inertia
of departmental bureaucracy.
The degree to which these objectives have been achieved can be ascer-
tained only by a close analysis of the statutes. Before undertaking a de-
tailed discussion there are general characteristics of the public corpora-
tions which may be briefly listed.
(a) Each corporation is a body corporate with perpetual succes-
sion,"- a common seal and power to hold land without license in mort-
main.12 And each is an independent personality.
(b) There are no shares and no shareholders in the public corpora-
tion. The people of the nation acting through the government exercise
the rights of shareholders and, it is anticipated, will receive shareholders'
benefits in the form of more efficient services at less cost.
(c) The administration of each corporation is vested in a board ap-
pointed by the appropriate minister.13 There is no requirement that
members of the board represent any specific interests.' 4 They must, how-
ever, be chosen from among persons who have had wide experience and
shown capacity in industrial, commercial or financial matters, in adminis-
tration, or in the organization of workers.
9. Friedmann, The New Public Corporations and the Law, 10 MOD. L. REv. 233
(1947).
10. ROBSON, PUBLiC ENTmRis 363 (1937).
11. Compare the United States Reconstruction Finance Corporation which, as
originally constituted, had succession for a period of ten years from the date of the
Act. 47 STAT. 6 (1932).
12. Gas Act § 5(1); Electricity Act § 3(1); Transport Act, 1st Schedule; Avia-
tion Act, 1st Schedule; Collieries Act § 2 (1).
13. In the gas industry, the nation is divided into areas administered by area
boards responsible to the senior board. Gas Act §§ 1, 2. Each facet of the transport
industry is administered by executives responsible to the senior commission. Trans-
port Act §§ 1, 5.
14. The Board of the Port of London Authority consists of representatives of
the directly interested industries. Port of London Authority (Consolidation) Act,
1920, 10 & 11 GEo. V, c. lxxii.
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(d) Each corporation is responsible to the government but only in-
directly in that the responsibility passes through the competent minister
to Parliament. 15
(e) The capital of the corporation is provided either by assets taken
over from formerly private industries and capitalized by the issue of in-
terest bearing bonds 16 or, in the case of industries not acquiring the assets
of heretofore private industries, i. e., the new airways corporations, by the
issue of bonds and the receipt of Exchequer grants.'
7
(f) Finally, the corporations have dual functions. They are com-
mercial undertakings dedicated to paying their own way I but also, being
publicly owned they are instruments of national policy playing a major
role in the planning of the mixed economy of Great Britain.' 9
AUTONOMY VERSUS CONTROL
Parliament calling upon experience which has taught that successful
operation of a business enterprise by a government requires a vehicle of
management that is flexible and free in its day-to-day activity from in-
terference by the executive or legislature but which must be accountable
to the public, has created public corporations to administer the nationalized
industries. The proper balance of autonomy and public control as exer-
cised by the competent minister and other branches of the government
presents a complex problem. The primary purpose of exercising control
is the formulation of long-range programs to develop each industry so
that the greatest benefit to the national interest may be realized. Beyond
that, the administrative freedom for which the public corporation is es-
tablished demands that interference be minimized. It is along this line
that criticism may be directed at certain provisions of the statutes as being
inconsistent with that requirement.
Control of Board Membership.-In the matter of appointing members
to each of the boards appears the first possibility of excessive outside
interference. In each instance, appointment is by the competent minister.20
The method itself is satisfactory in that it is at this point that Parliamen-
tary control through criticism of the minister will impinge on the compo-
sition of the corporate boards. Such control is necessary in that the
boards are delegated broad discretion in implementing national policy.2'
Nonetheless, the minister's power of appointment should be diluted if
excessive interference by him is to be avoided. Dilution of appointing
15. In the United States the corporation is directly responsible to Congress, Con-
gress being analogous to a board of directors. The directors of the corporation func-
tion only as managers. Lilienthal & Marquis, Government Business Enterprise, 54
HARV. L. REv. 545, 570 (1941).
16. The American term, bond, will be used throughout this Note although the
acts employ the British equivalent, stock.
17. The grants are given to finance the initial period of operation. They may
be extended only until the financial year expiring April 1, 1956. Aviation Act §§ 11,
12.
18. The corporations are to be self-supporting on an average of good and bad
years. Transport Act § 3 (4) ; Collieries Act § 1 (4) (c).
19. See Friedmann, supra note 9, at 236.
20. Gas Act §§ 5 (2) (a), 5 (4) (a) ; Electricity Act §§ 3 (2) (a), 3 (3) (a) ; Trans-
port Act § 1 (2) ; Aviation Act § 1 (3); Collieries Act §§ 2(3), 4(2).
21. The powers given to the Coal Board for example, by § 1 of the Act are almost
unlimited. It is inevitable that such broad discretion in a basic industry will impinge
on national policy.
powers can be achieved by such devices as fixed tenure, staggered terms,
and clearly defined grounds for dismissal. The Bank Act incorporates all
the above devices 22 while the other acts give the ministers full power over
the tenure of members of the boards.23  The desired independence of the
boards cannot be achieved where members of the boards are not assured
fixed tenure by statutory provision. But, on the other hand, the principle
of fixed tenure should not be pressed too far. The boards are instruments
of national policy. Hence conflicts between the policy of the boards and
government policy must be avoided. In the event of a change in govern-
ment a conflict would be imminent, and the new government should not
be hampered by an unsympathetic group of boards should it desire to
effect a change in policy2 4 Parliament in delegating to the ministers
broad latitude in respect to appointments made sure that the political atti-
tude of the boards would be in accord with that of the government in
power. Whether the power will be abused depends on the ministers'
restraint and Parliamentary criticism.
Direction of Policy.-A more delicate problem concerns the degree
to which the appropriate minister on his own motion or Parliament
through the competent minister may direct the policy of the boards. Again,
administrative freedom demands a minimization of such control. On
the other hand, the public corporations cannot each exist in vacuo; the
actions of each must be coordinated with the others' and their overall
policy integrated with that of the existing government. To this end, each
act contains a general directions clause: "The Minister may, after con-
sultation with the board, give to the board directions of a general character
as to the exercise and performance by the board of their functions in re-
lation to matters appearing to the Minister to affect the national in-
terest, and the board shall give effect to any such directions." 25 The
wording of the provision suggests that the minister has complete power
of direction.2 6 A degree of control is essential; the minister must be
satisfied that the policy of the corporation conforms to the general govern-
ment policy for which Parliament may hold him answerable.27 That the
minister was given such broad discretion, that is to say, that "matters ap-
pearing to the Minister to affect the national interest" were not specifically
delineated, is but a recognition of the impossibility of foreseeing every
contingency or circumstance in which it would be necessary or desirable
for the minister to give directions to the board.28 Generally, these would
relate to the framing of major programs and not to their detailed execu-
22. Bank Act, 2d Schedule.
23. Gas Act § 5 (8) ; Electricity Act § 3 (7) ; Transport Act § 1 (3) ; Aviation Act,
1st Schedule; Collieries Act § 2(7). However, a standard practice may develop by
ministerial regulation. See S. R. & 0., 1946, No. 1094, regulating appointment to the
Coal Board in pursuance of § 2(7) of the Collieries Act.
24. To a certain extent this possibility is circumscribed by provisions requiring
the board to give effect to directions of a general character from the minister. E. g.,
Collieries Act § 3(1).
25. Gas Act § 7(1) ; Electricity Act §5(1) ; Transport Act § 4(1) ; Aviation Act
§4; Collieries Act § 3(1).
26. Mr. Eden referring to the directions clause of the Coal Act said: "What in
the world could be wider than that? What does not appear to the Minister to affect
the national interest? Almost any conceivable subject concerning the industry could
be covered by that." 418 H. C. DEB. 721 (5th ser. 1946).
27. 418 H. C. Din. 707 (5th ser. 1946).
28. Ibid.
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tion.29  The ministers themselves have emphasized that it is not their
intention to interfere in the day-to-day operations of the boards. 0 Never-
theless, as the provision now stands, the only limitation on the minister's
power of interference is his own integrity. It is surprising that the au-
tonomy sought by the corporate device should be guaranteed by so
ephemeral a check.31
Annual Reports and Audits.-The intent of the statutes is to remove
the routine administration of the boards from the meticulous supervision
exercised over government departments by Parliament.3 2  But Parliament
has properly not seen fit to depend solely on liaison through the minister
for information upon which to evaluate the performance of the corpora-
tions. To this end, the acts nationalizing the five major industries require
that each board shall make an annual report 3 3 and audit 3 4 to the minister
who shall lay a copy of each before Parliament. These reports are de-
signed to form the basis for a debate in Parliament, and through direc-
tions to the minister Parliament's sovereignty is exercised. One grave
flaw appears in these provisions. The report submitted to the minister
may be inadequate fully to inform Parliament in that although the pro-
vision requires the inclusion of directions given by the minister to the
board during the year, the minister may direct the board to withhold any
direction from the report if in his opinion it is in the national interest
to do so.3 5 In this respect Parliament has delegated its sovereignty
to too great a degree. The corporate board is responsible to the minister
who in turn is accountable to Parliament and that being so, the minister
should be fully accountable; it is anomalous that the minister should
himself determine the extent to which his directions to the board shall
be disclosed to Parliament, his master. If in any event secrecy is neces-
sary Parliament should be able to provide it.36
Financial Structure.-Consistent with the desire to establish au-
tonomous corporations, financing of the corporations through government
subscription to their bonds was properly denied. Government ownership
of the corporations' capital would entail excessive Parliamentary or minis-
terial control of the corporations' financial structures.3 7 Equally, it is
patent that a public corporation could have no private shareholders. The
inducement normally extended to shareholders, of the right to participate
in the control of the industry, is gone, but in its place is the security of
return on investment, noted below. The method then of future financ-
29. Ibid.
30. 422 H. C. DEB. 968 (5th ser. 1946) ; 418 H. C. DEB. 968 (5th ser. 1946) ; 418
H. C. DEB. 807 (5th ser. 1946). The Postmaster General expressed the same senti-
ment in respect to his responsibilities to the British Broadcasting Corporation. 219
H. C. DEB. 2489 (5th ser. 1928).
31. A concrete check is seen in §§ 2(5), 2(6) of the Aviation Act. The minister
is given authority to limit the powers of the corporation as he thinks desirable in the
public interest, but any order to that effect must be laid before Parliament which can
annul it within forty days.
32. 422 H. C. Dn. 604 (5th ser. 1946).
33. Gds Act § 10; Electricity Act § 8; Transport Act § 4(7) ; Collieries Act § 54.
34. Gas Act § 50; Electricity Act § 46; Transport Act § 94; Aviation Act §21;
Collieries Act § 31.
35. Gas Act § 10(5); Electricity Act §8(2); Transport Act § 4(7); Aviation
Act § 22(3); Collieries Act § 54(2).
36. Secrecy would be justified in the interest of national defense or where it would
be undesirable to make information accessible to foreign competitors.
37. GoRnox, THE PUBLmc CoaoRAxioxs ix GREAT B=rAiN 337 (1938).
ing chosen by the acts was to have the corporations finance themselves by
selling in the open market interest bearing bonds whose issue entails no
shareholder control.38 In the case of Cable and Wireless, the Coal Board,
and the Bank of England the bonds are government bonds, i. e., bonds
whose principal and interest are charged against the Consolidated Fund
of the United Kingdom 8 9 out of which payment is made without being
subject to annual debate and vote in Parliament.40 In the case of the other
corporations, the bonds are issued by the board itself.41 Each of these
acts, however, provides that the Treasury "may guarantee, in such manner
and on such conditions as they think fit, the redemption or repayment of,
and the payment of any interest on, any stock issued," 4 and that any
sums required for fulfilling a guarantee shall be charged to the Consoli-
dated Fund.43  It is submitted that both types of provisions, government
bonds and Treasury guarantees, are methods of relieving the governing
boards of the worry of creating too rigid a capital structure which would
threaten the continued stability of undertakings faced with variable market
conditions. In each of the industries, the likelihood of fluctuations in
revenue might well lead the board to hesitate to commit itself to in-
escapable capital charges. Through the devices of government bonds and
Treasury guarantees, much of the risk is passed to the state itself 44 by
creating a form of insurance for investors. Lower borrowing rates will
result which in turn will reduce the overhead of the corporations to such
an extent as greatly to reduce the risk to them.
45
In most instances, the issue, redemption, transfer, and other dealings
with the bonds of the corporations will be governed by regulations made
by the minister with the approval of the Treasury.4 6 Further, the cor-
porations may raise temporary loans only with the consent of the Treas-
ury,47 and the Treasury may guarantee such loans on any condition it
thinks fit.48 These factors coupled with the device of Treasury guarantees
of bonds must not be used as tools whereby the Treasury acts as self-
appointed guardian over the finances of the corporations. Adequate safe-
38. These bonds are in addition to those of like nature already issued as com-
pensation for the acquisition of property. See Note, British Nationalization of In-
dustry-Compensation to Owners of Expropriated Property, 97 U. oF PA. L. REv.
520, 530 et seq. (1949). As to the airways corporations, see note 17 supra and text.
39. Cable and Wireless Act §§ 1(2) (a), 1(3); Collieries Act §§ 32, 33; Bank
Act § 1(1) (b), 1st Schedule § 1.
40. Friedmann, supra note 9, at 250.
41. Gas Act § 42; Electricity Act § 39; Transport Act § 89; Aviation Act § 8.
42. Gas Act § 45; Electricity Act § 42; Transport Act § 90; Aviation Act § 9.
Note that in the gas industry the Board may also establish its own guarantee fund
for the same purposes. Gas Act § 46.
43. Gas Act § 45; Electricity Act § 42; Transport Act § 90; Aviation Act § 9.
44. Not all the risk is passed. Treasury guarantees, if taken advantage of through
a default by the corporations, must be repaid. Gas Act § 45 (2); Electricity Act
§ 42 (2) ; Transport Act § 90 (2) ; Aviation Act § 9(3).
45. The Chancellor of the Exchequer estimated that because of the elimination of
risk, bondholders of the Transport Commission would accept an income of 122,750,000
as against 40,000,000 paid to security holders under private ownership. 431 H. C.
DEB. 1810-1811 (5th ser. 1946).
46. Gas Act §43(2) ; Electricity Act §40(2) ; Transport Act § 89(3) ; Aviation
Act § 8(3).
47. Gas Act §42(1) ; Electricity Act §39(1) ; Aviation Act §7(1). The Trans-
port Commission may borrow without Treasury consent, but the amount outstanding
in respect to temporary loans may not exceed 125,000,000. Transport Act § 88(1).
48. See note 42 supra and text.
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guards over the corporations' financial structure are present. The public
nature of the corporations is in itself a protection against faulty financing.
Each act also limits the total borrowing power of the corporation.49 " And
further there are the provisions for auditing and accounting reports which
are to be laid before Parliament annually, ° a recognition that in the
absence of competition the most effective method of protecting public
interest is through the medium of publicity. In light of these safeguards,
at least until a default occurs, the corporations should be allowed free
control over their finances, and the Treasury should not utilize the methods
available to it to interfere.
LEGAL STATUS
The broad question of the juridical nature of the corporations presents
countless problems. Insofar as Parliament has specified their incidents as
respects particular legal relations, it is apparent that the corporations are
to be treated substantially as private concerns.
Common to all acts is a provision relative to the payment of taxes
or other charges: "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to exempt the
Commission from liability for any tax, duty, rate, levy or other charge
whatsoever, whether general or local." 51 Other provisions impose full
liability upon the corporations in actions, proceedings, and prosecutions. 52
Consistent with the private character of the corporations, the boards are
removed 53 from the Public Authorities Protection Act 54 which provides
that no action shall be commenced against a public authority more than
twelve months after the cause of action accrued. In this respect, however,
a privilege has been granted in that the normal six-year period of limi-
tations in actions of contract and tort 55 has been reduced to three years.56
On the other hand, the corporations have been granted certain privi-
leges and powers consistent with their public character. Already noted
is the limited privilege of a shorter period of limitations. More prominent
are powers of compulsory acquisition of land provided for in four of the
statutes.57  Finally, each corporation has the power for a limited period
to disclaim agreements made by the undertakings prior to nationalization
where the board considers such agreements to have been unreasonable
or imprudent.58 This power is part of the machinery designed to facilitate
the transfer of the undertaking from private to public ownership. The
49. Gas Act § 42(3) ; Electricity Act § 39(3) ; Transport Act § 88(2) ; Aviation
Act § 10; Collieries Act § 26.
50. See note 34 supra. The audit is by a private company, it being felt that gov-
ernment accounting methods were not sufficiently flexible. 422 H. C. Dim. 1938 et
seq. (5th ser. 1946).
51. Gas Act § 13; Electricity Act § 11; Transport Act § 10; Aviation Act § 6;
Collieries Act § 47.
52. Aviation Act § 6(2) ; Collieries Act § 49(4).
53. Gas Act § 14(1) ; Electricity Act § 12(1) ; Transport Act § 11(1) ; Collieries
Act § 49(1).
54. Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, 56 & 57 VIcr., c. 61.
55. As set by the Limitations Act, 1939, 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 21.
56. Gas Act § 14(2) ; Electricity Act § 12(2) ; Transport Act § 11(2); Collieries
Act § 49(2).
57. Gas Act § 11(1); Electricity Act § 9(1); Transport Act § 8(1); Aviation
Act §26(1).
58. Gas Act § 22(1); Electricity Act § 18(1) ; Transport Act § 15; Collieries
Act § 7(2). In the Gas, Electricity, and Collieries acts, however, provision is made
for arbitration.
limitation of this power to those agreements made prior to the transfer
is a feature distinguishing the corporation from government departments
in that the latter have the permanent power unilaterally to terminate a
contract 9 However, it is to be noted that under the minister's power
to give general directions, where both contracting parties are public cor-
porations, similar orders from each minister can effect any variation or
cancellation of the contract. But, where one party to the agreement is
a private individual, variation or cancellation can be achieved only by
agreement as between two private persons.
To the extent that Parliament has not defined the characteristics of
the corporations, it will be for the courts to determine them. The term
corporation, itself, may be misleading. Because of the nature of the
nationalized industries, principles drawn from the common law of private
corporations may not be reliable; each legal problem, as it arises, must be
considered in relation to the nature of the corporations rather than on the
basis of an inquiry whether Parliament has created a "corporation." The
public nature of the corporations should not be construed as authorizing
any disregard of private interests unless sanctioned by the statutes; pro-
tection of the individual will be achieved through normal procedure; ordi-
nary courts will be competent to deal with ordinary actions of tort and
contract. As yet there has been no question as to the application of
ultra vires principles to the statutory capacity of the corporations, but it
has been suggested that the public corporations should be subject to ultra
vires rules governing public authorities.30 It is submitted that the rea-
sons advanced to support this contention are slim.61 Further, it is more
reasonable and desirable for the courts to adopt a firm attitude in regard-
ing the corporations as commercial beings than to inject into the com-
mercial field, concepts applicable to public authorities.62  Thus as respects
ultra vires the nationalized corporations should be treated as other cor-
porations with the possible exception that because of the public nature
of the corporations operating for public benefit there would be no need
for strict construction of their powers.
63
PROTECTION OF CONSUMER INTERESTS
The ultimate protection of the consumer who deals with the public
corporations is the responsibility of Parliament. The link through the
minister responsible for each corporation does not establish sufficient con-
tact between the consuming public and the corporation. The liaison be-
tween the public in general or groups tfiat are particularly interested in a
given industry has been tightened by the creation of advisory or con-
sultative councils whose purpose is to give independent advice to the
ministers.64 The councils represent an intelligent and necessary departure
59. Among the standard conditions of British government contracts is a "break"
clause granting the government authority to determine the contract subject to rea-
sonable indemnification and limited resort to arbitration. Friedmann, mpra note 9, at
233 n. 32.
60. Id. at 377, 379 et seq.
61. Only in the Transport Act is there reference to any of the administrative
hierarchy as "public authorities." And there, the reference is to the executives who
are subordinate to the Commission. See note 13 mtpra.
62. Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations, 21 VA. L. REv. 465, 502
(1935).
63. The unlimited scope of the "power" clauses indicates that Parliament intended
little interference from the courts.
64. Gas Act § 9; Electricity Act § 7; Transport Act § 6; Aviation Act § 36; Col-
lieries Act § 4.
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from the past method of theoretical control through political pressures
upon Parliament. The characteristics of the councils vary. In all cases
however, the minister appoints the members of the councils but in no
instance does he have a free hand in determining the composition of the
councils. 65 Typically, in the case of the coal industry the minister must
consult "with such bodies representative of the interests concerned as the
Minister sees fit" and further, he is obligated to "have particular regard
to nominations made to him by the said bodies representative of the in-
terests concerned." 66 Although the provision is elliptical, it is intended
as a guarantee that no favoritism will be granted any particular consumer
interest, an especially important protection in that there is no clause in any
act requiring price impartiality.
6 7
The function of the councils is to advise and report to the minister
on matters on which they are declared to be competent by statutory pro-
vision.68 Each council is to make an annual report to the minister, and
the minister shall lay the report before each House of Parliament.6 9 In
this manner, Parliamentary pressure will encourage the minister seriously
to consider recommendations of the councils. But in no event is the
minister bound to follow suggestions given; he may accept or reject their
advice. This is consistent with the intention that the boards shall carry
on as free from outside interference as possible. In addition it would be
inconceivable to give the councils power to require the ministers to carry
out their advice as this would be giving them power without responsibility.
SUMMARY
The over-all structure of the public corporations cannot be criticized.
The purpose of public control was to make possible a long term view in
the interest of the nation of the development within a specified industry.
The nationalized industries, however, are business enterprises that can be
most efficiently carried on by the government through an agency which
possesses a high degree of autonomy and flexibility. The general struc-
ture of the boards as created by the statutes is entirely compatible with
these objectives.
The successful operation of the corporate device depends upon the
qualities which account for its high potential of efficiency being exercised
as free from outside control as is consistent with the corporations' public
nature. Criticism may be directed at provisions in conflict with this de-
sired freedom of action. The relationship to the corporation of the minister
in the question of appointment and of the minister and Parliament in the
matter of giving directions has not been clearly defined, leaving room for
emasculating control of the corporations from without. The same danger
of outside control by the Treasury of each corporation's financial program
is inherent in the financial provisions of the statutes. These powers of in-
65. Gas Act § 9(2); Electricity Act § 7(2) ; Transport Act § 6(4) ; Aviation Act
§36(1) ; Collieries Act §4(2). See 422 H. C. DEB. 1570 (5th ser. 1946).
66. Collieries Act § 4(2).
67. Although the Gas Consultative Council and the Air Transport Advisory Coun-
cil are the only councils specifically given jurisdiction over rates [Gas Act § 9(4);
Aviation Act §§ 36(2), 36(3)], it is apparent that a primary function of all the coun-
cils will be the protection of various classes of consumers from price discriminations.
68. Gas Act § 9(4); Electricity Act § 7(4); Transport Act § 6(7); Aviation
Act §§ 36(2), 36(3) ; Collieries Act § 4(3).
69. Gas Act §§ 10(4), 10(5) ; Electricity Act §§8(4), 8(5); Transport Act
§ 6(9) ; Aviation Act § 36(9) ; Collieries Act § 4(8).
terference must be treated as residuary powers to be exercised with the
utmost restraint in special circumstances, leaving to the corporations in-
ternal control of their functionings.
However, the corporations are public institutions and must be held
accountable as such. To this end, provision has properly been made for
a periodic appraisal by Parliament of the corporations' achievements. Im-
mediate and continuing contact with consumers through the consultative
councils has been provided to impress upon the corporations a constant
awareness of public requirements. These are adequate instruments for
intelligent and fair evaluation and control only if viewed through dispas-
sionate eyes. If political factors are allowed consideration, any examina-
tion will be destructive rather than helpful.
C.E.I.
Industrial Nationalization and Industrial Relations in
Great Britain
The initial political success of the British Labor Party 1 came in 1900
when the Party elected two of its candidates to the House of Commons.
2
The Party flourished despite judicial antagonism,3 and in the 1945 elec-
tions seated a majority of the House of Commons for the first time in its
history.4 Throughout the intervening half-century the varied elements
of the Party-trade unionists, Fabian Socialists, and Syndicalists alike 5-
had insisted upon an industrial nationalization program as one of the
planks of the Party platform. The Party therefore assumed that its
overwhelming victory in the 1945 elections indicated a popular demand
for its program, and the size of its Parliamentary majority made the
attainment a relatively easy political task.
1. The Labor Party was founded in 1900 as the Labor Representation Committee,
adopting its present name in 1906. A partial list of histories of the Party includes,
BLANCHARD, AN OUTLINE OF THE BRITIsH LABOR MOVEMENT (1923) ; COLE, A SHORT
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT (1927). The earlier phases of
trade unionism may be found in BEATRICE & SIDNEY WEBB, HISTORY OF TRADE UNION-
ISMi (1920), INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1902).
2. Two labor leaders were elected to the House of Commons in 1874, but the Labor
Party's first success as a political party came in 1900 with the election of Keir Hardie
and Richard Bell.
3. See Osborne v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, [1910] A. C. 87
(furtherance of political ends is not a legal objective of trade unions). Other famous
anti-labor decisions include Hornby v. Close, L. R. 2 Q. B. 153 (1867) (trade union,
one of whose principal objects is to support men on strike, is unlawful as in restraint
of trade) ; Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q. B. 715 (actionable to persuade men
not to return to work) ; Taff Vale Judgment, [1901] A. C. 426 (union liable for acts
of agents) ; Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A. C. 495 (two persons who induce a strike
are liable where one might not be). Treatises on British trade union law include
HEDGES & WINTERBoTTOm, THE LEGAL HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM (1930) ; Slssmi
& BAxER, TRADE UNION LAW (1927).
4. The Labor Party governments of 1924 and 1929 were not majority governments
and, from labor's viewpoint, were disappointingly ineffective. See MARQUAND, ORGAN-
IZED LABOUR IN FOUR CONTINENTS 164-172 (1939).
5. The Syndicalists favored worker control of the socialized industries while the
Fabian Socialists favored parliamentary control. See Dahl, Worker's Control of In-
dustry and the British Labor Party, 41 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 875 (1947). For an un-
sympathetic analysis of worker control, see Simons, Some Reflections on Syndical-
ism, 52 J. POL. EcoN. 1 (1944).
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It is the purpose of this Note to examine those provisions of the
nationalization statutes which pertain to industrial relations. Particular
emphasis is placed on the methods by which the legislation strives to main-
tain the delicate balance between workers and managing boards. Although
no attempt is made to treat the entire field of British labor relations, those
aspects which affect the nationalized industries are discussed; the role and
new functions of the trade union in a nationalized industry are analyzed.
THE PROPOSED BASIS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
From the viewpoint of industrial relations, no more varied industries
could have been nationalized than those chosen. For example, one of
the prime reasons for government ownership in the coal industry was
the need for better worker-management relations," while the smoothly-
operating procedures and lack of industrial strife in the gas industry were
models for other industries to follow. 7 Yet in all the industries affected,
the same approach to industrial relations has been adopted by the legis-
lation: the setting up of machinery for collective bargaining between the
unions and the respective boards.9 The collective bargain, marked by
voluntary agreement and conformance, is the nexus between workers and
management.
The Party of the First Part: The Board.-The sections of the statutes
pertaining to the composition of the managing boards 9 indicate clearly
that those who advocated "worker control of industry" 10 did not prevail.
Instead, the statutes provide that the board be composed of members hav-
ing had experience in "industrial, commercial, or financial matters, ad-
ministration of the organisation of workers." I Thus there is no mandate
that trade unions or workers be represented on the board, which is to be
composed of independent experts. The syndicalist philosophy of worker
control has given way to the parliamentary control espoused by the Fabian
Socialists.'
2
6. This was emphasized by the famous Reid Report, CMi. No. 6610 at 118 (1945).
7. CmiD. No. 6699 at 27 (1945) ; 447 H. C. DEB. 243, 298, 408 (5th ser. 1948).
Electricity also had a good labor relations history. 432 H. C. DEB. 1420, 1483 (5th
ser. 1947).
8. Gas Act, 1948, 11 & 12 GEo. VI, c. 67, § 57; Electricity Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEo.
VI, c. 54, § 53; Transport Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEo. VI, c. 49, § 95; Civil Aviation Act,
1947, 9 & 10 Gao. VI, c. 70, § 19; Coal Industry Nationalisation [Collieries] Act, 1946,
9 & 10 GEo. VI, c. 59, §46. These acts are cited hereinafter by short-title and section
number only.
9. Gas Act § 5 (4) ; Electricity Act §§ 3 (2) (a), 3 (3) (a) ; Transport Act § 1 (2);
Aviation Act § 1(2) ; Collieries Act § 2(3) ; Bank of England Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo.
VI, c. 27, § 2(2).
10. Dahl, supra note 5, passim. The problem of worker control has by no means
been solved to the satisfaction of all. Complaints have come from the unions that
there is only one union man on the Road Transport Executive. 448 H. C. DEB. 16
(5th ser. 1948). On the other hand, Sir Charles Reid, Chairman of the National
Coal Board, resigned because of too much worker interference. 154 TE ECONOMIST
847 (1948). See also 150 THE EcoNOMIST 832 (1946).
11. See note 8 supra. There is no such enumeration of categories in either the
Aviation Act or the Bank Act. One of the directors of the bank is a trade union
leader, however. See Bopp, Nationalization of Bank of England and Bank of France,
8 J. OF PoL. 308 (1946).
12. The reasons for the present triumph of Fabianism are expounded by an old-
time socialist in Cole, The National Coal Board, 17 POL. Q. 310, 313-316 (1947).
So long as the Labor Party remains in power, the members ap-
pointed by the appropriate minister will, in all probability, be sympathetic
toward the demands of the employees. Certainly the statutory provisions
as to the securing of safety, health, and welfare of the workers 13 should
influence the boards to be more amenable to workers' demands than were
private employers. Further, even if the board wishes to adopt a con-
trary attitude, it must follow the general directions of the minister,14 so
that the policy concerning broad labor issues will be determined by a
Labor Party cabinet member. Obviously there is no guarantee that the
Labor Party will remain in power, and whereas the removal powers of
the minister are not quite so broad as his appointment powers,'r a change
of personnel of the boards is not unlikely on the election of a new Parlia-
ment and the consequent creation of a cabinet of different social convic-
tions. The statutory provisions for the boards' personnel, therefore, will
be an important factor in determining the incidence of labor disputes due
to conflict between boards and workers.
The Party of the Second Part: The Proper Union.16-The selection
of the proper representative of the workers 17 presents the board with an
immediate problem. The relevant statutory language 18 (with minor varia-
tions in the different statutes 19) states:
Except so far as they are satisfied that adequate machinery ex-
ists for the purposes of achieving this section, it shall be the duty
of the Board to seek consultation with any organisation appearing to
them to be appropriate [for setting up negotiation machinery] .20
The onus of selecting the union is directly on the board, and consequently
the avoidance of jurisdictional disputes is the board's, and only the board's
responsibility.21 The lack of a standard by which the board was to choose
and the fact that the choice was the board's alone were cause for concern
13. It is the stated policy of the various acts to secure the safety, health, and
welfare of the employees. Gas Act § 1 (7) ; Electricity Act § 1 (6) ; Collieries Act
§ 1 (4) (a). '
14. Gas Act § 7(1) ; Electricity Act § 5(1) ; Transport Act § 4(1) ; Aviation Act
§4; Collieries Act §3(1) ; all of which state that the minister may give directions of
a general nature in matters affecting the public interest and that the board "shall give
effect to any such directions." (Emphasis added.) See Note, The Role of the Public
Corporation in British Natiowlized Industry, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 534, 537 (1949).
15. See id. at 536.
16. There is a plethora of literature on the British trade union and trade union
movement. The most recent study is BAROU, BRmsH TRADE UNIONs (1947).
17. Clearly the workers are not to be considered civil servants or government
employees. 419 H. C. DEa. 266-268 (5th ser. 1946).
18. Of interest is the fact that the original coal bill contained no clause requiring
collective bargaining. It is not clear whether this was a deliberate omission or inad-
vertent. Possibly it was based on the conviction that the Board would be such a model
employer that there was no need for such requirement. See 423 H. C. DEB. 78 (5th
ser. 1946) ; 149 THE EcoNOMIsT 899 (1945).
19. The difference in language appears to have no significance. The Collieries
Act omits the exception of adequate existing machinery and states that the Board is
to "enter into" consultation. The Collieries Act also sets a standard for union recog-
nition. See note 22 infra.
20. See note 8 supra.
21. Compare United States procedure under which an independent government
tribunal, the National Labor Relations Board, has the task of determining the proper
bargaining agent. The problem of union recognition caused 1.7 per cent of the work
stoppages in Great Britain in 1947. 56 MIN. OF LAB. GAz. 163 (1948).
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in Parliament, but no satisfactory substitute could be found.22  This is
characteristic of the legislative intent to leave the management of the in-
dustry with the board, with a minimum of Parliamentary interference. 23
Settlements of the jurisdictional disputes which have occurred in the
nationalized industries have ranged from recognition of both unions in-
volved 24 to reference to an arbitration tribunal.25 It does not follow
that such disputes will not reappear, since the statutory language does
not render the machinery permanent.2 6 Thus the board will be able to
exert coercion on union leaders by the threat of recognition of another
union, while on the other hand, the union members may threaten to form
or join another union if the present leaders cannot obtain their demands.
In the past, the Trades Unions Congress 2 has settled various jurisdic-
tional disputes by its machinery, and it is conceivable that the boards
will avail themselves of this machinery.
28
The degree of organization varied throughout the industries prior
to nationalization; 29 however, even in an industry as highly organized
as coal there has been jurisdictional trouble.30 One solution of the juris-
dictional problem is the closed shop, until recently not a normal union
demand in Great Britain,3 ' although such a demand would not be an
illegal term of employment.3 2  Great opposition to such a require-
ment for employment in a nationalized industry would probably
22. See 439 H. C. DEB. 457-466 (5th ser. 1947) ; 432 H. C. DEB. 1649 (5th ser.
1947). Collieries Act § 46 sets as a standard, "organisations appearing to the Board
to represent substantial proportions of the persons in the employment of the Board."
In an industry as highly organized as coal such a requirement would seem to be un-
necessary. Furthermore, the standard is a subjective one and "substantial" an am-
biguous term.
23. The government has consistently refused to assist in the selection of the union.
447 H. C. DEB. 1922 (5th ser. 1948) ; 432 H. C. DEB. 1649-50 (5th ser. 1947).
24. The National Coal Board compromised such a dispute by negotiating with both
the National Union of Mineworkers and the Clerical and Administrative Workers
Union when the dispute could not otherwise be settled. London Times, Dec. 11, 1947,
p. 3, col. 2.
25. A court of inquiry recommended that there should be no separate recognition
of winding men, but that the National Union of Mineworkers should make better pro-
vision for their representation. 56 MIN. OF LAB. GAz. 43 (1948).
26. The duty of the board is to enter into consultations with organizations of
workers appearing to them to be appropriate. When the organization no longer ap-
pears to be appropriate, there would seem to be no reason why the board could not
consult with a new "appropriate" organization.
27. The Trades Union Congress is the central labor organization, a unified coun-
terpart of the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions. In January, 1947, of 8,714,000 union members, 7,540,397 were members of the
187 unions affiliated with the Trades Union Congress. 55 MIN. OF LAB. GAZ. 290
(1947). For a description of the activities of the Congress, see BAROU, op. Cit. supra
note 16, at 42; RICHARDSON, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN 59 (1933).
28. BAROu, op. cit. supra note 16, at 46. The National Coal Board has already
availed itself of this machinery in deciding who was to be given facilities to organize
the staff members. NATIONAL COAL BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT OF STATEMENTS AND
AccouNTS FOR 1946 [hereinafter ANN. REP.] 16 (1948).
29. Thus, 82 per cent of the workers in coal mining were organized, 58 per cent
in water transport, 16 per cent in banking. BARou, op. cit. supra note 16, at 248-249.
30. See notes 24, 25 supra.
31. 4 LAB. AND IND. IN BRITAIN 160 (1946).
32. The closed shop would possibly have been prohibited in a nationalized industry
by the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927, 17 & 18 GEo. V, c. 22, § 6(1), but
the Act was repealed in 1946. Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1946, 9 & 10
GEo. VI, c. 52. Even prior to its repeal, the Act had been liberally interpreted. See
London Passenger Transport Board v. Moscrop, [1942] A. C. 332 passim. See also
430 H. C. DEE. 696-762 (5th ser. 1946) ; 427 H. C. DEB. 630-708 (5th ser. 1946). Com-
pare § 8(a) (3) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 140, 29
U. S. C. § 158 (a) (3) (Supp. 1948), prohibiting the closed shop in the United States.
arise,33 but the question of whether the boards will grant such a demand
will depend in large part upon the frequency of unofficial, wildcat, strikes
and the degree to which the unions can maintain discipline in industries
where union membership is not a condition for employment.
The implications of jurisdictional disputes are far-reaching. In a
private-enterprise economy union leaders feel it necessary to press manage-
ment closely in order to represent their membership properly and to re-
tain the support of their members. Such conflicts should be out of place
in a nationalized economy where the emphasis is to be on cooperation and
not on conflict. Since jurisdictional disputes are a manifestation of
worker dissatisfaction with union leadership, and this is in turn indica-
tive of dissatisfaction with conditions of employment, then to the extent
that jurisdictional disputes appear, the industrial relations program of the
nationalized industries will have been unsuccessful.
The Status of the Ageement.-Parliament has determined that the
labor relations problems of each industry are for the boards and workers
of that industry and not a subject for legislative action. The pertinent
statutory provisions require the board to seek consultation with the proper
unions-
. . . with a view to the conclusion between the Board and the
organisation of such agreements as appear to the parties to be de-
sirable with respect to the establishment and maintenance of ma-
chinery for (a) the settlement by negotiation of terms and conditions
of employment for persons employed by the board, with provision for
reference to arbitration in default of such settlement in such cases
as may be determined by or under the agreements.
4
It is readily seen that no substantive terms or conditions of employment
are determined by this provision. There is a duty on the board only to
"seek consultation" with a view to setting up machinery for negotiations,
with arbitration in cases only where these agreements so provide. A literal
interpretation of this clause means that there is no duty to provide for
arbitration at all since it is only for cases determined "by or under" the
agreements. But since the normal arbitration clause of collective bargain-
ing contracts in Great Britain has a wide scope,3 5 there is little probability
of litigation arising out of the refusal of one of the parties to include a
certain portion of the collective bargaining area under the arbitration
clause. Further, under normal conditions the decision of the arbitrator
is not binding 3 6 so that this "requirement" seems to be only a recom-
mendation.
37
33. See the debates in the House of Commons, note 32 supra. See also 431 H. C.
Db. 1647 (5th ser. 1946) ; 430 H. C. DEB. 733, 759 (5th ser. 1946).
34. See note 8 supra.
35. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL. RELATIONS [hereinafter REPORT]
5 (U. S. Dep't Labor 1938) ; SuRvzY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS [hereinafter SuRwvY]
265-282 (British Committee on Industry and Trade 1926). But cf. RIcHAIwsoN, op.
cit. supra note 27, at 100.
36. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS HANDBOOK 18 (1944); BEA.TRIcE & SIDNEY WEBB,
INDUSTRIAL DEmoCRA C 222 (1902). The Industrial Courts Act, 1919, 9 & 10 GEo.
V, c. 69, creating a court to inquire into and arbitrate labor disputes, did not provide
that the decisions of the court should be binding.. See § 3(3). See also RIcHARDsON,
op. cit. supra note 27, at 132; REPORT 67; StvEY 48.
37. Compare Transport Act § 97 which sets up machinery for the determination
of rates of pay and hours and conditions of service of police forces, and expressly
states that the arbitrator has power to give binding decisions. This section seems to
be based on a previous method of police force negotiations. See Railways Act, 1921,
11 & 12 GEO. V, c. 55, § 67(2).
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With the repeal of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927,8
the extant labor legislation is the Trade Disputes Act, 1906.39 Prior to the
original Act of 1871 a trade union's contracts were void inasmuch as the
principal purposes of the union were in restraint of trade at common
law. 40  By freeing the unions from criminal 4  and civil liability 4
2 the
Act of 1871 enabled unions to enter into contracts. But these contracts
did not become enforceable since Section 4 of the Act states that no agree-
ment between trade unions is directly enforceable in a court of law.4 3 By
definition an association of employees or employers is a trade union.
4 4
Ever since the initiation of the collective bargaining concept the majority
and most important of the agreements have been "collective agreements,"
i. e., between associations of employers and unions; "shop agreements"
between a union and a single employer have been comparatively rare.43
Thus the majority of collective bargaining contracts have been legally
unenforceable. 46 Conversely, and paradoxically, the less important "shop
agreement" appears enforceable.
7
This anomaly may be of legal significance when an industry is nation-
alized. For now the bargaining on the employer's side is carried on by
a single employer, the board, whereas before it was carried on by an
association of employers. It will require some straining of language to
fulfill the desire to keep the employees in the same legal status as they
held under private ownership.
48
38. 17 & 18 GEo. V, c. 22, repealed May 22, 1946, by the Trade Disputes and
Trade Unions Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. VI, c. 52.
39. 6 EDW. VII, c. 47, as amended, Trade Union Act, 1913, 2 & 3 GEO. V, c. 30.
This legislation amended the original Trade Union Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vicr., c. 31.
40. Farrer v. Close, L. R. 4 Q. B. 600 (1869) ; Homby v. Close, L. R. 2 Q. B.
153 (1867). See HEDGES & WINmoT0om, op. cit. supra note 3, at 52-62. For the
effect of the restraint-of-trade doctrine on modem trade union law, see Kahn-Freund,
The Illegality of a Trade Union, 7 MoD. L. Rxv. 192 (1944) ; Friedmann, The Harris
Tweed Case and Freedom of Trade, 6 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1942).
41. Trade Union Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vicr., c. 31, § 2.
42. Id. § 3.
43. McCluskey v. Cole, [1922] 1 Ch. 7; Holland v. London Soc'y of Compositors,
40 T. L. R. 440 (K. B. 1920).
44. Trade Union Act, 1871, 34 & 35 VicT., c. 31, § 23, as amended, Trade Union
Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vicr., c. 22, § 16, Trade Union Act, 1913, 2 & 3 GEo. V, c. 30,
§1(2).
45. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS HANDBOOK 22 (1944); Tillyard & Robson, The En-
forcement of the Collective Bargain in the United Kingdom, 48 EcoN. J. 15, 48 (1938).
46. Labor has long demanded that the agreement be made enforceable as against
the employer. See 52 INT'L LAB. REv. 561 (1945).
47. See Robson, The Future of Trade Union Law, 1 Poi- Q. 86, 89 (1930) ; Till-
yard & Robson, mtpra note 45, at 15.
48. However, Transport Act § 96 provides that the negotiation procedures set
forth in the collective bargaining agreements may amend earlier legislation (Railways
Act, 1921, 11 & 12 GEo. V, c. 55, §§ 62-66; London Passenger Transport Act, 1933, 23
GEO. V, c. 14, Part VI). If the agreements under § 95 are unenforceable the para-
doxical result of a voluntary unenforceable agreement amending a statute will be
achieved.
One possible conceptual "solution" to the problem of enforceability and the desire
not to change the status of these employees is to consider the various subsidiary
branches of the boards, e. g., the area boards, the executives, the separate aviation cor-
porations, as independent employers; thus the parent board could be considered an
association of employers.
A letter from the Labor Counsel of the British Electricity Authority, Sept. 9,
1948, states that it is "almost inconceivable" that agreements made under the direction
of Parliament would be unenforceable. The same letter, however, states that there
has never been any attempt to avoid an arbitrator's award in that industry.
THE AVAILABLE SANCTIONS
Any discussion of legal sanctions must be considered against the back-
ground of a half-century in which the parties to labor disputes in Great
Britain have preferred to settle their differences privately and without
judicial intervention. 49 Further, it is difficult to dissociate the present
emergency conditions and controls from the long-range position of labor
in a nationalized industry. For example, inasmuch as the ultimate sanc-
tions in any collective bargaining agreement are the strike and the lock-
out,50 the present no-strike, no-lockout provisions of the Conditions of
Employment and National Arbitration Order of 1940 51 seem to render
nugatory the collective bargaining provisions of the acts. Yet it is the in-
tent of the government that this prohibition is to be temporary and to in-
terfere with the normal processes of collective bargaining to a minimum,
5 2
so that any discussion of sanctions must include both the temporary sanc-
tions and those available after the present emergency has passed.
During the Transition.-Compulsory arbitration and its concomitant,
government regulation of industrial relations,53 had been foreign to in-
dustries which were well organized before the war,54 but in 1940 in order
to insure industrial peace the government, after consultation with unions
and management, promulgated the Conditions of Employment and National
Arbitration Order 5 5 creating the National Arbitration Tribunal as a final
arbiter. 6 In 1945 the Order was renewed, again with the consent of
unions and management, for another five yearsY7 The Tribunal was
49. REPORT 6.
50. Frey, The Logic of Collective Bargaining and Arbitration, 12 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 264, 269 (1947).
51. S. R. & 0., 1940, No. 1305, as amended, S. R. & 0., 1941, No. 1884, S. R. &
0., 1942, No. 1073. S. R. & 0., 1944, No. 461, provided for five years' imprisonment
or a fine for inciting a strike or lockout in essential industries. This Order was re-
voked by S. R. & 0., 1945, No. 504. As to the efficacy of such sanctions: "You might
as well try to bring down a rocket bomb with a pea shooter as try to stop a strike by
the processes of the criminal law." Address by Sir Hartley Shawcross, Attorney-
General, 419 H. C. DEB. 200 (5th ser. 1946).
52. The Order itself is only conditional. It prohibits strikes if not referred to
the minister for arbitration within twenty-one days after the strike has been reported
to him. Further, the minister must refer the dispute to the machinery set up by the
collective agreement if such machinery exists. The National Arbitration Tribunal is
to be used only as a last resort.
53. Frey, supra note 50, at 273-274.
54. The forerunner of modern compulsory arbitration legislation was the Spita-
fields Weavers Act, 1773, 13 GEO. III, c. 68, which empowered justices of the peace
to fix wages for silk-weavers. During World War I there was compulsory arbitra-
tion for the munitions industry. See note 83 infra. For industries which were not
well organized, trade boards were set up for the determination of Wages. See SELLS,
BRrnsTH WAGEs BoARDs (1939). These boards have now been replaced by wages
councils. Wages Councils Act, 1945, 8 & 9 GEO. VI, c. 17. See Stokes, Administra-
tion of Tribunals, 24 PuB. ADMIN. 156, 162 (1946). A brief history of modem arbi-
tration legislation can be found in Aronson, British Industrial Arbitration, 2 ARB. J.
(N. s.) 161 (1947).
55. See notes 51, 52 supra.
56. For a description of the Tribunal and its mode of operation, see Ross, Indus-
trial Relations in Great Britain, 58 LAW Q. 184, 188 (1942). An extremely able and
erudite analysis of the legal effect of its orders can be found in Kahn-Freund, Col-
lective Agreements Under War Legislation, 6 MOD. L. REv. 112, 125 et seq. (1943).
For statistics on the number of cases handled, see Flexner, Arbitration of Labor Dis-
putes in Great Britain, 1 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 421, 423 (1948).
57. Wages Councils Act, 1945, 8 & 9 GRo. VI, c. 17.
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eminently successful, and there were no official strikes during the war.
8
The decision of the Tribunal in a dispute over terms of employment be-
comes an implied term of employees' contracts throughout that industry.59
Thus, in the sense of government regulation of terms of employment,
every industry has been potentially nationalized during this period. This
concept, the legalizing of the "normative effect" of the collective agree-
ment, i. e., the making of the terms of one collective bargaining agreement
the conditions of employment throughout the industry, is one which has
been increasingly utilized in British industrial relations. 60
As part of the same general order, the government took control over
the direction of workers to jobs. 61 After hostilities ceased, workers grew
restive and the controls were removed from all industries except coal,
agriculture, and construction. 2 But direction of workers to needed oc-
cupations by persuasion, attractiveness of job, and exhortation proved in-
effective, and in 1947 the government was forced to reinstate the controls
in modified fcrm.68
As a result of the extension of these wartime controls, there exist to-
day rigid controls over the freedom of workers, both as to their ability
to change location and to bargain as they stand. These controls exist for
private and nationalized industry alike. To date, they have caused rela-
tively little difficulty, 64 but this must be considered in light of the emer-
gency nature of the period. Unless there is a change in present and tra-
ditional attitudes, labor and management alike will insist that the controls
be removed when it is felt that the emergency has passed.
The Long-range Problem.-Labor has insisted and government has
guaranteed that employees will retain their right to strike.65 The converse,
58. The record of the Tribunal was not unblemished, however. In June, 1947,
140,000 working days were lost due to dissatisfaction over its awards. 56 Mix. OF
LAB. GAz. 163 (1948). See 154 THE ECONOMIST 579 (1948) for details of a strike
after the dispute had been submitted to the Tribunal.
59. Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order, S. R. & 0., 1940,
No. 1305, § 2(5). The award is not retroactive but becomes an implied term of the
contract only when the employee sues for breach. Hulland v. William Sanders & Son,
[1945] 1 K. B. 78.
60. See Kahn-Freund, Collective Agreements Under War Legislation, 6 MOD.
L. REv. 112 (1943). Compare Aviation Act §41(1) which states that if an inde-
pendent air company hires people not covered by statute, collective bargaining, or
industrial council, such employees must have the same conditions as the employees of
the three nationalized corporations (whose conditions are determined by collective
bargaining). The government will not prosecute the private corporations, but the
initial action must be taken by the employees. 453 H. C. DEB. 1169 (5th ser. 1948).
The Coal Board, in licensing the operation of those small mines which may be ex-
cluded from government control by the Board, provided that all agreements in the
nationalized mines regulating wages and conditions of employment and the settlement
of disputes should be binding on the operators of the small mines. ANN. REP. 11.
61. See note 51 supra. See also Cooper, Labor Mobilization Legislation, 11 GEo.
WAsr. L. REv. 213-217 (1943) ; Hoague, Wartime Conscription and Control of Labor,
54 HARv. L. REv. 50, 69-72 (1940) ; Schoenfeld & Whitney, Wartime Methods of Deal-
ing with Labor in Great Britain, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 522 (1942).
62. 53 MIN. OF LAB. GAz. 47 (1945).
63. The controls apply only to those falling out of employment. S. R. & 0., 1947,
No. 2021. See statement of the Prime Minister, Aug. 6, 1947, 55 MIN. OF LAB. GAZ.
252 (1947).
64. The extent of labor strife after the recent war was much less than after the
last one. From August, 1945 to the end of 1946, 3,750,000 working days were lost in
disputes. In the corresponding period after World War I, 39,500,000 working days
were lost. 5 LAB. AND IND. IN BRITAIN 200 (1947).
65. 5 id. at 75; Witte, Experience with Strike Legislation Abroad, 248 ANNALS
138, 140 (1946).
the right of the boards to lockout, seems unlikely to be exercised. Under
normal circumstances, the legal sanctions available to the board will depend
upon the enforceability of the collective bargaining agreement and the
actual terms of the agreement. Further, the resistance of the board to a
strike will depend largely upon the gravity of the strike, the Parliamentary
temper, and the responsiveness of the board to that temper. Bankruptcy,
one fear of private management, can be only a remote possibility and a
negligible coercive force.
The Electricity Authority in setting up machinery for negotiations,
provided for arbitration by the Industrial Court,60 such decision to be
binding on the union, the employees, and the Board.67 If the union strikes
in violation of this provision and the contract is held enforceable,6 8 the
Board conceivably can sue the union or the" individual workers for breach
of contract,6 9 although it cannot sue the union in tort for inducing a breach
of contract.70 The use of the injunction has been so rare in British labor
disputes that it is doubtful if it will appear at this late date.
Deliberate violations of the existing agreements by the boards seem
improbable, so that unions will not be concerned with the problem of
exerting pressure in the forms of strikes or threats of strikes in order to
force the boards to live up to their agreements; but unions, if they con-
tinue their present attitudes and functions, will be concerned with the
problem of exerting economic pressure on the boards to obtain new de-
mands. If a strike becomes too serious, the government (as distinguished
from the board) can make use of the Emergency Powers Act, 1920,71
taking action which is tantamount to a declaration of martial law. An
interesting manifestation of the legislative protection of the rights of labor
is the provision of this Act that to strike or to persuade others to strike
cannot be made an offense by virtue of the emergency. 72 Further, there
are special statutory weapons in the electricity and gas industries, provid-
ing that the willful and malicious breach of an employment contract, where
the result is likely to create grave danger to the community, is a criminal
offense.
7 3
AN INDEX OF FAILURE: THE UNOFFICIAL STRIKE
Although the emergency no-strike order has been effective in pre-
venting official strikes,7 4 work stoppages in the form of unofficial, wildcat,
strikes have not been uncommon.7 5 Since productivity figures remain
66. The Industrial Courts Act, 1919, 9 & 10 GEO. V, c. 69, created a court to in-
vestigate labor disputes. This court has power only to recommend solutions, and its
decisions are not binding on the parties.
67. Section 20 of the three agreements between the British Electricity Authority
and the three operating unions, March 31, 1948. 56 MIN. OF LAB. GAz. 158 (1948).
The Coal Board agreement also provided that the decision in a dispute whether reached
by negotiations or arbitration was to be binding. ANN. REF. 13-14. For details of
this agreement see note 87 infra.
68. See text at notes 38-48 pra.
69. See text at note 81 infra.
70. Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 EDw. VII, c. 47, §4(1), passed to nullify the
effect of the Taff Vale Judgment, [1901] A. C. 426. See also Vacher & Sons v. Lon-
don Soc'y, [1913] A. C. 107; Conway v. Wade, [1909] A. C. 506.
71. Emergency Powers Act, 1920, 10 & 11 GEO. V, c. 55.
72. Id. § 2(1). The statute was called into play during the dock strike of 1946.
Immediately after the declaration of the emergency, but prior to any direct govern-
mental action, the strikers returned to work.
73. Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vicr., c. 86, § 4
(gas); Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, 9 & 10 GEO. V, c. 100, § 31.
74. See note 64 supra.
75. In 1947, an estimated 620,000 workers took part in 1,721 strikes, losing
2,398,000 working days. 56 MIN. OF LAB. GAZ. 163 (1948).
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inconclusive, 76 one of the better yardsticks of the success of the industrial
relations program is the incidence and duration of the unofficial strike.
By this measure nationalization has as yet made little contribution toward
industrial peace.
77
The demarcation between official and unofficial strikes is often difficult
to draw. In the United States there has been a growing tendency to im-
pose liability for unofficial strikes on the union whose members are strik-
ing.78  In Great Britain, where the institution of unionism has been so
firmly established that there appears to be no desire'on the part of manage-
ment to weaken the existing union,79 such a tendency is not discernible.80
However, the Coal Board has on several occasions sued the individual
strikers for breach of their employment contracts.8 1 Such suits show the
use of relatively severe measures to break the strike, the resort to the
courts for enforcement of individual employment contracts, and the refusal
or inability of the Board to place responsibility upon the union for the
actions of large portions of its membership.
Other than the weapons available to management, there remain of
course the governmental sanctions mentioned above.82 These measures
are as applicable to unofficial as official strikes, but their effectiveness
is doubtful. In World War I, strikes were prohibited in the munitions
industry only,8 3 yet there was no proportional difference in work stoppages
in this industry from the rest of industry where strikes were not pro-
hibited.8 4 Since the prohibition was universal in the past war, no such
comparative data are available. It is clear, however, that the prohibition
did not eliminate the strike from the industrial scene.
The solution of the problem of the unofficial strike will not rest
with the courts or with the government in its sovereign capacity. It is
apparent that in an industry such as coal, where labor disputes have been
76. E. g., in coal, output per man-shift for the end of 1947 was 1.11 tons as com-
pared with the 1938 average of 1.14 tons. But the trend was upward, for in the same
period of 1946 output had been 1.05 tons. 6 LAB. AND IND. IN BRITAIN 8 (1948).
Productivity in coal, however, is probably primarily dependent upon improved ma-
chinery which workers have opposed in the past. CMD. No. 6610 at 4 (1945).
77. The Coal Board assumed control January 1, 1947. In 1946, 216,000 workers
took part in 1,329 strikes, losing 422,000 working days. In 1947, 307,900 workers took
part in 1,053 stoppages, losing 912,000 working days. 56 MIN. OF LAB. GAZ. 163
(1948).
78. Sections 301(b), 301(e), Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 STAT.
155, 29 U. S. C. § 185 (Supp. 1948). See Note, 96 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 85, 99 (1947).
Logically this position is difficult to justify. The payment of damages by a union
which presumably was too weak in the first place to maintain discipline over its
members can serve only to weaken the union further, lessening its disciplinary power
in consequence.
79. Witte, supra note 65, at 141.
80. The government expressly refused to introduce legislation making unions
liable for unofficial strikes. 414 H. C. DEB. 2202 (5th ser. 1945).
81. London Times, Jan. 17, 1948, p. 3, col. 3, March 10, 1948, p. 4, col. 3.
Statutory authority for suits by employers against workmen is the Employers and
Workmen Act, 1875, 38 & 39 VIcT., c. 90. The government refused to withdraw the
ration cards of unofficial strikers. 413 H. C. DEB. 846 (5th ser. 1945). It has used
soldiers to do the work of the strikers. N. Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1947, § IV, p. 4, col. 6.
In Dorman, Long & Co. v. Carroll, 173 L. T. 141 (K. B. 1945), eight days was con-
sidered sufficient notice for miners to discontinue work under an altered clause in
their contracts.
82. See text at notes 49-73 supra.
83. Munitions of War Act, 1915, 5 & 6 GEo. V, c. 54, § 2.
84. CLAY, THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 208 (1929). As to the
general ineffectiveness of anti-strike legislation, see Settlement of Labor Disputes in
Seven Foreign Countries, 63 MoN. LAB. REv. 224 (1946).
a part of the culture of the miners,8 5 fines or government intervention will
not prevent strikes or produce coal when the miners refuse to work. The
present disappointment over the failure of nationalization to act as a
panacea for all labor troubles is a natural result of the over-optimism of
the socialists.80
In large part these unofficial strikes have arisen from dissatisfaction
with the procedures of dispute settlement-dissatisfaction due to improper
representation or undue delay. Upon nationalization it was necessary to
retain practically all the lower management levels so that the change in
ownership was scarcely manifested to the men in the pits who were
under the supervision of those men who had been their supervisors under
private ownership. However, the Board and the unions have been at-
tempting to speed up the existing machinery and, significantly, have been
developing new procedures for consultation between workers and manage-
ment with the greatest emphasis on the lowest, or pit, level.
8 7
The solution of disputes in thJir incipiency, the grievance procedure,
is the heart of the collective bargaining agreement,8 and the establish-
ment of swift procedures for the solution of individual and group griev-
ances at the lowest level is essential. As the size of the bargaining unit
increases, it becomes more and more difficult for the parties to see that
these lower levels are properly represented. The methods by which the
boards handle this problem and the results obtained merit close observa-
tion by advocates of industry-wide collective bargaining in the United
States.
THE SECONDARY VOICE OF LABOR
Labor is not limited in its voice in the management of industry to
the collective bargaining procedures. Nor is the board relieved of all its
obligations merely by conforming to its agreements. For although the
boards are expected to be model employers,8 9 certain statutory duties are
placed on them to insure this result. Detailed pension provisions are set
forth.90 Officers who suffer loss of employment because of nationalization
are to be compensated.9 1 The boards must take steps to advance the
skill and efficiency of their employees and their equipment.9 2 In addition
they must set up machinery for discussions of matters of mutual interest
85. CmD. No. 6610 at 36, 38 (1945).
86. See, e. g., the claims in the debates on the coal bill. 418 H. C. DEB. 708,
712-715, 971-972 (5th ser. 1946).
87. Any issue arising between the workers and the management is discussed be-
tween the men and the colliery official concerned. If no agreement is reached, the
matter is discussed at a "pit" meeting which must be held within five days. Next
comes a meeting of the District Disputes Committee, consisting of union and divi-
sional board representatives, within fourteen days. Finally, the dispute, if still un-
settled, is referred to an umpire. ANN. REP. 14. See also 6 LAB. AND IND. IN
BRITAIN 128 (1948) ; London Times, Oct. 23, 1947, p. 5, col. 6; 153 THE ECONOIIST
468 (1947) ; 149 THE ECONOMIST 120 (1945).
88. See GOLDEN & RUTTENBERG, DYNAMIcs OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 83-118
(1942); SELEKMA ", LABOR RELATIONS AND HUMAN RELATIONS 77 (1947). In one
instance 6,000 miners struck for fourteen days because of faulty grievance procedure.
London Times, Oct. 30, 1947, p. 4, col. 5.
89. 437 H. C. DEB. 53 (5th ser. 1947) ; 418 H. C. DEB. 706, 708, 712-714 (5th
ser. 1946). But cf. 150 THE ECONOMIST 805 (1946).
90. Gas Act § 58; Electricity Act § 54; Transport Act §§ 98, 99; Aviation Act
§ 20; Collieries Act §§ 40, 41.
91. Gas Act § 60; Electricity Act § 55; Transport Act § 101; Aviation Act § 42.
92. Gas Act § 4(1); Electricity Act § 2(2); Transport Act § 2(2) (b) ; Col-
lieries Act § 1(2) (f).
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to the boards and employees, including matters concerning the efficiency
of the boards' services. 93  The generality of such a clause leaves the
settlement of the scope of the discussions up to the machinery, and it is
conceivable that no area of the boards' activities will be excluded from
the discussions. Although no statutory duties requiring the boards to
heed such recommendations were created, these provisions for consulta-
tion were the subject of much Parliamentary debate as to the exact word-
ing of the scope of the discussions,94 so that it is obvious that the legis-
lature intended the boards to consider the suggestions seriously. And it
is the expressed intent of the boards to do so.9 5
The machinery which has been created has followed the pattern of
joint industrial councils,96 which are a form roughly equivalent to the
industry committees created by the Fair Labor Standards Act in the
United States.97  The effectiveness of this machinery, the degree of con-
sideration which the boards give to the recommendations, and the extent
of actual employee participation in the management of the industry should
indicate to some degree the practicability of greater worker control of
industry.
Organized labor has been granted another voice in the management
of industry-as a consumer. Each act provides for the creation of advisory
councils to represent the public in advising the board.98 Here again one
of the categories from which the members of the councils are to be
selected is that of those "experienced in the organisation of workers."
But due to the necessarily low proportion of workers on these councils,99
it is doubtful whether such representation is of real significance.
THE NEW FUNCTION OF A TRADE UNION
In a private-enterprise economy, one of the factors which determine
the effect of work stoppages upon the community is the extent to which
goods and services can be replaced at the same cost to the community. 10 0
The degree of substitution depends in turn upon the presence of competi-
tive elements in the industry which can make up the unsatisfied demand.
If it is assumed that a strike temporarily removes from competition a
given producer, then as the number of competitors in an industry de-
creases, the possibility of replacement is diminished and the loss to the
community, in the sense of unsatisfied wants, increases. The economic
93. Gas Act § 57(1) (b) ; Electricity Act § 53 (1) (b) ; Transport Act § 95 (1) (b);
Aviation Act § 19(1) (b) ; Collieries Act § 46(b).
94. E. g., 439 H. C. DEB. 238 (5th ser. 1947); 436 H. C. DaB. 2082 (5th ser.
1947) ; 432 H. C. DEB. 1421 (5th ser. 1947).
95. Addresses by Lord Citrine, Chairman of British Electricity Authority: at
conference of Authority, Divisional Controllers, and Area Boards, April 9, 1948; at
inaugural meeting of conciliation machinery, April 29, 1948.
96. This form was based on the recommendations of the Whitley Committee in
1916. See INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS HANDBOOK 23-25 (1944); SURvEY 294. For de-
tails of the formation of the councils in the coal industry, see ANN. REp. 16.
97. 52 STAT. 1062 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 205 (1946). There are no public mem-
bers on the British councils.
98. Gas Act § 9(2) (b); Electricity Act § 7; Transport Act §§ 6, 66(3); Aviation
Act § 36.
99. E. g., the Electricity Authority provides for a Consultative Council of twenty
to thirty persons, not less than half of whom shall be nominated by local authorities,
the remainder to be appointed after consultation with organizations representing agri-
culture, commerce, industry, labor, and the general interest.
100. This analysis ignores the loss to the community in the form of waste-loss
of labor and productive facilities whether directly or indirectly (secondary boycotts).
problem of strikes within the frame of reference of capitalism, therefore,
reaches its zenith when there is no competition, i. e., under monopoly
conditions. The tendency in the United States, the protagonist of capital-
ism, has been to curtail the right to strike in these monopoly industries.10 1
This tendency is a denial of the fundamental bases of collective bargaining,
and compulsory arbitration, the most popular substitute for the right to
strike, is a contradiction in terms.'02 Yet the right of any group to with-
hold the requirements of the majority in a democracy is at best question-
able. The problem of the right to strike in "essential industries" is, in
miniature, the philosophical problem of western civilization: the problem
of freedom versus order.
Although the life of the community is not in jeopardy because of
curtailment of production, the United States has limited the right to
strike. 03 The nationalization of an industry, per se, removes all competi-
tive factors so that replacement of goods and services by competitive forces
is impossible. It thus seems anomalous that Great Britain with its im-
perative need for production still maintains that the right to strike in
nationalized industries remains.' 0 4 But the retention of the right to strike
in Great Britain is consistent with the political philosophy of government
abstention from regulation of the individual, further exemplified by the
refusal to regulate wages by statute. 0 5 That this philosophy is substan-
tially due to political exigencies seems obvious, but the fact remains that
its application will determine in large part the success of the present pro-
gram.
106
The retention of the right to strike in Great Britain may take one
of several courses. It can be a real weapon in the unions' armory and
utilized as in a private-enterprise economy. However, one, if not the
only, motive for production in a private-enterprise economy has been
presumably eliminated by nationalization: production for profit. Thus
the managers of the industry are no longer concerned with obtaining the
maximum profit and should be proportionally less resistant to workers'
demands. But if "production for use" has replaced production for profit,
it would seem clear that a union should be limited in its wage demands.
The fixing of the price of the goods and services is left substantially to
the discretion of the boards, 0 7 but it is the duty of the boards to supply
goods and services so as best to further the public interest in all respects.108
If a demanded increase in wages would raise the prices of the product to
an extent not commensurate with the public interest, then the exertion
of economic pressure by the unions would be a denial of the purposes of
101. See §208 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 155,
29 U. S. C. § 178 (Supp. 1948) ; see Note, 97 U. oF PA. L. Rlv. 410 (1949).
102. See Frey, supra note 50, at 272.
103. See note 101 supra.
104. See note 65 supra and text. If, as is claimed by capitalist economists, the
capitalistic economy is the most flexible and resilient to shocks, this anomaly is
accentuated.
105. CitD. No. 7321 (1948), quoted in 56 MiN. OF LAB. GAZ. 40 (1948).
106. And, to the extent that the industries are nationalized on the advent of a
Conservative government, the success of the Conservative program, since that party
has stated that it will maintain the present nationalization program although it will
go no further. N. Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1947, p. 1, col. 3.
107. Cf. Note, The Role of the Public Corporation in British Nationalized In-
dustry, 97 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 534, 542 n. 67 (1949).
108. See, e. g., Coal Act § 1(1) (c) ; ANN. REP. 1.
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the socialists.109 A union which insists upon wage increases beyond this
point of "reasonableness" can obtain them only at the expense of other
workers, and no longer at the previously assumed expense of the capitalists,
as in the private-enterprise economy.
The retention of the right to strike could also serve as a second-guess
device of the government whereby it permits the union to strike once and
then, strengthened by public reaction against the consequences of the strike,
prohibits further strikes in the industry. A policy which allows the use
of the strike weapon only once is, in effect, equivalent to allowing no
use 'at all.
Or, the retention of the right to strike can become a right which is
never exercised, a nominal right which withers away from disuse.
It is the last course for which the government is hoping and responsible
trade union leaders are striving. 01 If these leaders are successful and
the right to strike becomes a non-operating right, it is apparent that the
traditional function of trade unions-the exertion of economic pressure
upon employers-will become obsolete.
What then will be the new function of the trade union? At its
weakest it could become a mere advisory body whose opinions are ac-
corded little weight. This would be equivalent to a return to the era
before effective union organization-with one difference: the management
of the industry is delegated not to those who have the interests of a rela-
tively few owners or their own self-perpetuation or financial aggrandise-
ment at heart, but to those who are to serve the public interest and who
are to be devoted to the welfare of the workers. While this is a consum-
mation devoutly to be wish'd, it is doubtful if British workers and unions
will be satisfied with the passive role of relying upon the uncertainties of
individual nobility and political fortunes to assure their ends.'
At the other end, the union could become one of the strong partners in
the cooperative management of the industry. This could be accomplished
through the present forms of negotiation and consultation; through the
introduction of new forms which give the union negotiators more power
in final determinations; through the appointment of more union men as
managers. Because of the traditional strength of unions and the political
nature of the composition of the government, it is to be anticipated that
the new trade union will be a powerful, although not necessarily dominant,
force in the management of these industries, no matter what form the
actual transition may take.
It is submitted, however, that this control by unions will come about
only if their responsibilities to the public are fully realized; that a dis-
cussion of union rights and privileges in the future is a mere academic
exercise if unions do not measure up to the confidence which has been
109. BEVERIDGE, FULL EMPLOYMENT IN A FREE SocIErY 198-201 (1945).
110. Address by Charles Dukes, President of Trades Union Congress, at 78th
Annual Session of the Congress (1946), quoted in 55 INT'L LAB. REV. 152 (1947).
See also address by George Woodcock, Assistant General Secretary of Trades Union
Congress, 5 LAB. AND IND. IN BRITAIN 123 (1947).
111. See the remarks of the delegation of Iron and Steel Trades Confederation
on their return from a visit to Soviet Russia: "The functions and activities of the
trade union may differ to some extent in a Socialist state from what they are in a
capitalist state, but never, in our view, to the point that seems to be accepted in the
Soviet trade unions-that the workers' principal interests can safely be left to a
workers' government which must necessarily and at all times have the interests of
the workers at heart. Our faith in the perfection of human beings, and particularly
Governments, has not yet reached that dizzy height." 149 THE ECONOMIST 748
(1945).
placed in them by the existing legislation. The essence of the manage-
ment of a nationalized industry is the public interest. If this considera-
tion is minimized or overlooked by unions, the industrial relations aspect
of nationalization must necessarily revert to the pre-existing conflicts be-
tween workers and management. If the outcome of these conflicts is
lack of production, or high prices, the consequences of public disappoint-
ment with the program conceivably could take the form of return of the
industries to private ownership, or the prohibition of traditional unionism
and worker 'freedom. Thus, the role of the trade union in the nationalized
industry will be determined substantially by the attitudes and activities
of the unions themselves.
SUMMARY
The most significant characteristic of the labor relations provisions
of the nationalization legislation of Great Britain is the attempted retention
of the philosophy of individual freedom. Emphasis is placed on improve-
ment of existing collective bargaining procedures, but the cornerstone of
the program is free collective bargaining.
The management of the industries is delegated to boards of experts
whose trade union membership is optional with the appointing minister.
Although labor is represented on the boards and on various consultative
committees, it is quite clear that the legislation has not adopted the theory
of worker control of industry.
The determination of terms and conditions of employment has been
left to collective bargaining machinery to be established by the boards and
unions selected by the boards, this latter requirement placing the problem
of proper union jurisdiction upon the boards. Heretofore, collective bar-
gaining in Great Britain has been on an industry-wide basis, and because
of the language of the Act of 1871, the agreements have been legally
unenforceable and the good faith of the parties has been the primary sanc-
tion for enforcement. Nationalization and the fusion of associations of
employers into one employer, by strict statutory construction, may make
these agreements legally enforceable.
During the present emergency period labor and management have
given up their ultimate sanctions, the strike and the lockout. Compulsory
arbitration has been adopted when the normal collective bargaining pro-
cedures break down. During this period while compulsory arbitration
is in effect, the index of success of the industrial relations programs of
the nationalized industries will be the frequency of the unofficial strike.
To date nationalization appears to have had little effect on the incidence
or severity of this type of work stoppage.
The present no-strike, no-lockout order is to be only temporary and
upon its expiration it is planned to restore these sanctions to private and
nationalized industry alike. This legislative intent, to retain in a social-
istic framework the weapons employed in a private-enterprise framework,
raises the basic problem of the socialists: the retention of individual free-
dom in a planned economy. Presumably the strike will be an anachronism,
but the formal renunciation or prohibition of the weapon will require a
reorientation of the average union member and a realization by trade
union leaders of their new responsibilities.
Assuming that the program of Great Britain, nationalization, is still
not acceptable to the majority of Americans, in at least one respect British
experience will present an object lesson: it is not possible for labor to
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enter the political field without assuming responsibilities for its objectives.
The assumption of these responsibilities will entail the relinquishing of
hard-won labor weapons. The problem which American labor will have to
solve, and for which British experience will provide precedents, is the
balancing of a political program with the retention of traditional trade
union practices.
M. L. S.
